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TIME IS MONEY:
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGES ARGUMENTS
JOHN CAMPBELL
BERNARD CHAO
CHRISTOPHER ROBERTSON'
ABSTRACT
Non-economic damages (pain and suffering) are the most significant

and variable components of liability.

Our survey of fifty-one U.S.

jurisdictions shows wide heterogeneity in whether attorneys may quantify
damages as time-units of suffering (per diem) or demand a specific amount
(lump sum). Either sort of large number could exploit an irrational

anchoringeffect.
We performed a realistic, online, video-based experiment with 732
human subjects. We replicatedprior work showing that large lump sum
demands drive larger jury verdicts, but surprisinglyfound no effect of

similarly-sized per diem anchors. We didfind per diem effects on binary
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liability outcomes, and thus expected case values, and we discuss potential
causal mechanisms, based in the cognitive science literature.
This empirical work contradicts the speculations by scholars and
courts that per diem arguments powerfully impact damage awards by
exploitingjuror irrationality.Nonetheless, our data surprisinglyshows per
diem arguments enhancing the expected value of cases by increasing win
rates, perhaps because they allow plaintiffs to explain the basisfor a large
request. This latter dynamic would not seem to justify the proscription
currently employed in some jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION

One of the most difficult tasks imposed upon ajury in deciding a case
involving personal injuries is to determine the amount of money the
plaintiff is to be awardedas compensationfor pain andsuffering. No
method is available to the jury by which it can objectively evaluate
such damages .... The chiefreliancefor reachingreasonableresults
... must be the restraintand common sense of the jury.
Beagle v. Vasold, 417 P.2d 673, 675 (Cal. 1966) (citing C.
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES § 88 (1935))
Flying down a highway at seventy-five miles per hour, the tread on the
front left tire of an SUV separates. The SUV crashes, paralyzing the driver.
At trial against the tire manufacturer, the plaintiffs attorney argues the
design of the tires was negligent, asking the jury to find the defendant liable
and to award damages. To support the request for economic damages, the
attorney provides the jury with past medical bills, calculates lost wages, and
totals other economic harm, such as the need to modify the plaintiff s home
to accept a wheelchair. Opposing counsel den ies liability, but argues in the
alternative that the economic damages are much lower, providing
competing expert opinions. After closing argument, the jury receives jury
instructions providing clear guidance on how to determine liability and
economic damages. The abiding hope is that a reasonable award allows the
tort system to serve its dual purposes of recompense and deterrence.
"Jurors report being deeply challenged by the task of arriving at damage
awards."' Non-economic damages, which on average account for 50%-80%
of the total jury award, are particularly difficult for jurors because they are
not tied to bills, lost income or future healthcare costs. 2 They are, instead,
an effort to quantify human suffering. And they matter. A retired person
who is severely injured may have almost no economic loss, but he or she
might suffer in severe pain the rest of his life.
So, what can attorneys say to jurors in closing argument on this
important and difficult topic? What impact will their argument have? Could
it unfairly swing impressionable jurors grasping for anything to hold onto?

1. Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to Quantitative
Translation in Jury DamageAwards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 122 (2011).
2. Neil Vidmar, The Performanceof the American Civil Jury: An EmpiricalPerspective,40 ARIZ.
L. REv. 849, 881-84 (1998).
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Could arguments about damages could seep into findings on liability?
These questions matter for plaintiffs, defendants, the justice system, and
society as a whole. Yet, courts have embraced wildly differing,
contradictory approaches to how attorneys may address non-economic
damages in closing argument. 3 In particular, courts differ on whether the
attorney is permitted to break down the years that the plaintiff will suffer
with her injuries and disabilities into smaller units of months, days, or even
minutes-a rhetorical strategy known as a "perdiem argument" (even when
not limited to days in particular). Some courts allow per diem calculations
of the amount of time a person will suffer but prohibit suggesting a
particular dollar amount (e.g., "plaintiff has 2,225,000 minutes of suffering
left in his life; award what you think is fair"). Others allow a lump sum
demand but no per diem calculation to support it (e.g., "please award
$4,000,000 for pain and suffering"). Still others allow both approaches
together-an argument that quantifies how long the plaintiff will suffer in a
unit of time then multiplies it by a fixed amount in order to support a total
demand (e.g., "58,240 hours left to be awake and in pain multiplied by $7.50
per hour, supporting an award of $436,000"). Finally, some states forbid
attorneys from saying anything at all about the time a person will suffer or
an appropriate amount, leaving the work entirely to the jury.
Each regime is purportedly justified by assumptions about how lump
sum and per diem calculations will impact a jury. 4 Some courts speculate
that per diem calculations will give jurors a false sense that damages are
certain, and this will result in runaway awards.5 Other courts speculate that
per diem calculations help jurors quantify pain and suffering damages, as
they provide jurors with guidance when deciding a difficult issue.
These are of course empirical questions. This article provides a complete
index of the contradictory legal regimes by classifying every state and then
randomly assigning mock jurors into one of the regimes, controlling all
other information presented. After exposing jurors to a rich forty-minute
trial stimulus, including all components of a real trial and legally-

3. See infra Part I. A.
4. See generally Shari Seidman Diamond et al., JurorJudgments About Liability and Damages:
Sources of Variabilityand Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAuLL. REV. 301, 318 (1998).

5. See Caley v. Manicke, 182 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ill. 1962). The Supreme Court of Illinois laid out
its reasoning for allowing lump sum arguments, but not per diem. In holding that the per diem argument
is improper, the court states that such arguments create "an illusion of certainty" that is not inherent in

pain and suffering. Id. at 208.
6. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155, 161 (Ky. 1960)
(holding that if jurors have to put exact figures on pain and suffering, then attorneys should be able to
provide guidance on how to do so).
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appropriate instructions, we measure both liability findings and outcomes,
just as real jurors decide cases. To enhance generalizability, we replicate
our own results with a convenience sample of law students.
We find that per diem arguments do not dramatically increase awards as
many states assume; they do, however, impact liability awards, despite the
fact they should be conceptually separate. Indeed, per diem arguments
increase liability awards by about 10%, a counterintuitive result that no state
law contemplates.
The article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we systematically survey the
fifty state laws on per diem and lump sum arguments to identify four distinct
legal regimes. We also review an expansive literature that sheds light on the
potential arguments for having one set of rules or the other. In Part II, we
lay out the design of our experiment. In Part III, we discuss results,
including outcomes on amount and variability of damages awards, binary
case outcomes, and case expected value. In Part IV, we discuss
methodological limitations and implications for law, policy, and strategy. A
short conclusion suggests directions moving forward. Appendices provide
citations to support the fifty-state survey and additional statistical analyses.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Law ofNon-Economic Damage Arguments
We undertook a fifty state (plus D.C.) review to identify state court
decisions addressing what closing argument tactics are permissible for
guiding the jury's non-economic damages decision. We found that the states
fall roughly into four categories:
1. States that allow a lump sum demand and per diem calculations to
support the demand (twenty-four states);
2. States that allow a lump sum demand but do not allow per diem
calculations to support the demand (nine states);
3. States that allow per diem calculations for the time plaintiff will spend
with pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment, etc., but that do not let the
plaintiff convert those into a dollar demand (two states);
4. States that prohibit both lump sum demands andperdiem calculations
(four states).
The list above covers thirty-nine states. In addition, there are eight states
that leave closing argument to the "sound discretion" of the trial court,
including how non-economic damages are argued. Four states that have no
clear appellate or statutory law providing a definite answer regarding lump

6
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sum demands and per diem calculations. In those states, our informal
conversations with practitioners suggest the reality on the ground is that
judges have their own preferences across the four dominant approaches, but
there is no prevailing statewide practice. Table 1 below displays each
category and the respective states.

Table 1. State Authority on the Permissibility of Non-Economic
Damages Arguments
Per diem
prohibited

Per diem
allowed

Lump sum
allowed

Lump sum
prohibited

Alabama
Alaska
California
Colorado
Connecticut
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas

Kentucky
Louisiana
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
New
Mexico
North
Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Rhode
Island
Vermont

New Jersey
Massachusetts

Illinois
Maine
Missouri
New
Hampshire
New York
North Dakota
South Carolina
Virginia
Wisconsin

Delaware
Pennsylvania
West Virginia
Wyoming

Note: The following states have unsettledor unclearlaw on the issue,
or allow trial court discretion: Arizona, Arkansas, Maryland,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, Washington. See the Appendix
for citation to and discussion of authority for each classification
decision.
As can be seen in Table 1, almost 50% of all states (twenty-four) allow

7.

More extensive citations have been provided in the Appendix.
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a plaintiff to make a lump sum demand and to support that demand with a
per diem calculation. States that allow this approach often support this rule
by stating that closing arguments are allowed to rely on "inferences" from
the evidence. This is consistent with the view that a closing argument is just
that- an "argument." And since closing argument is based on inferences,
the jury can accept or reject the arguments. For example, in rejecting a
challenge to lump sum demands and per diem calculations, the California
Supreme Court noted attorneys are "permitted to discuss all reasonable
inferences from the evidence." 8 Courts also suggest that both a lump sum
demand and a per diem calculation are a logical extension of how jurors
decide damages-as per diem arguments track how a jury may calculate
damages from the evidence. For example, the California Supreme Court has
said that, "[i]t would be paradoxical to hold that damages in totality are
inferable from the evidence but that when this sum is divided into segments
representing days, months or years, the inference vanishes." In states that
allow per diem arguments, the concern that such arguments will produce
impermissibly high awards is typically rejected. For example, a D.C. court
expressed faith injuries, stating that it has "confidence in our juries' ability
to distinguish between argument and evidence." 9 The same court also noted
the power of trial courts to remit verdicts if they were excessive.' 0
In nine states, courts concluded a lump sum demand is allowable, but
per diem calculations are impermissible. The most common justifications
for this position are that per diem calculations are either misleading or too
easily manipulated. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court held that per
diem calculations create "an illusion of certainty."" New Hampshire's
Supreme Court held that per diem arguments are too susceptible to
manipulation, stating, "[t]he mathematical formula applied to the plaintiffs
pain and suffering ... for her life expectancy of 233,600 hours can result in
any amount that the imagination of counsel deems advantageous."' 2
Even within these nine lump sum states, there is some variation in how
close to a per diem calculation an attorney can come. For example, in
Illinois, an attorney demanded $49,000 for a person with 49 years of life
expectancy.' 3 The court affirmed the award, noting that "[c]ounsel may

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Beagle v. Vasold, 417 P.2d 673, 678 (Cal. 1966).
Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Gray, 179 A.2d 377, 382 (D.C. 1962).
Id. at 383.
Caley, 182 N.E.2d at 208.
Duguay v. Gelinas, 182 A.2d 451, 454 (N.H. 1962).
Watson v. City of Chicago, 464 N.E.2d 1100, 1102 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
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properly suggest a lump sum figure for pain and suffering, and may make
reference to life expectancy in conjunction therewith." 1 4 The court reasoned
that life expectancy is critical in determining awards.15 It also noted that it
cannot be the law that "a total award for pain and suffering lump sum
demands which is easily divisible by the plaintiffs life expectancy" are
improper.16 As a result, although some states facially deny the propriety of
per diem arguments, they allow at least some reference to life expectancy,
so long as the explicit mathematical calculations are not expressed to the
jury.
There are two states that allow per diem calculations but prohibit a
specific reference to an ultimate monetary value for non-economic
damages. New Jersey provides the most insight into this approach as it has
one of the earlier decisions that prohibits per diem calculations and lump
sum demands. In Botta v. Brunner, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned
that "[t]here can be no doubt that the prime purpose of suggestions, direct
or indirect, in the opening or closing statements of counsel of per hour or
per diem sums as the value of or as compensation for pain, suffering and
kindred elements associated with injury and disability is to instill in the
minds of the jurors impressions, figures and amounts not founded or
appearing in the evidence." 17 It prohibited lump sum demands based on
similar reasoning. Subsequently, the Botta decision was cited extensively
across at least 163 different cases in at least twenty different states, with
some states agreeing and some disagreeing. Nonetheless, Botta is no longer
the law in New Jersey. Instead, New Jersey now has a very unusual regime:
attorneys cannot make a lump sum demand, but they can make a per diem
argument so long as it is not connected to a dollar amount.18 In other words,
attorneys can discuss the plaintiffs life expectancy in units of time (i.e.,
minutes), but cannot suggest how much a given unit of pain and suffering
is worth.
There are only four states that prohibit attorneys from providing a lump
sum demand and that also prohibit per diem calculations. They tend to do
so because they assert that such arguments are not supported by the evidence
and could be inflammatory. For example, Pennsylvania holds that lump sum
demands in "cases where the damages are unliquidated and incapable of

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at 1103.
Id.
Botta v. Brunner, 138 A.2d 713, 722 (NJ. 1958).
NJ. Ct. Rule 1:7-1(b) (2006). "In civil cases any party may suggest ...

be calculated on a time-unit basis without reference to a specific sum." Id.

unliquidated damages
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measurement by a mathematical standard" are impermissible because "they
tend to instill in the minds of the jury impressions not founded upon the
evidence." 1 9 Similarly, when prohibiting per diem arguments, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania notes that they are "of course improper." 20
In eight states, trial courts retain discretion about whether attorneys can
provide lump sum demands and per diem calculations in closing argument.
In these states, depending on the case, the judge, and any local rules, lump
sum demands and per diem calculations could be allowed or disallowed. 21
Courts that take this approach reason that "the conduct of final argument is
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and absent abuse of that
discretion, the trial court's ruling regarding final argument will not be
disturbed." 22

There are also four states in which we were unable to discover clear law
regarding lump sum demands and per diem calculations.23 In some cases,
such as Tennessee, the courts have expressly reserved rulings, stating that
"issues relating to the propriety of particular arguments must await the
appropriate cases."24 In other states, although the highest court has not ruled,
intermediate appellate courts have. For example, Texas intermediate courts
have approved of per diem calculations, making it the law of the land for
now. 25
B. LiteratureReview
In law reviews, there are two lengthy articles about per diem arguments.
Both suggest that per diem arguments should not be allowed. But neither
cite any data regarding the impact of per diem arguments, and a close
inspection of the articles suggests an underlying hostility towards
noneconomic damages generally.
The first article, Counting Angels and Weighing Anchors by Joseph
King, provides some useful history, explaining thatper diem arguments are
of a "fairly recent vintage" and that the technique was probably popularized
by Melvin Belli (nicknamed the "King of Torts").26 King captures the state

19.
20.
21.
22.

Stassun v. Chapin, 188 A. 111 (Pa. 1936).
Ruby v. Casello, 201 A.2d 219, 220 (Pa. 1964).
Richardson v. Child. Hosp., 787 N.W.2d 235, 245 (Neb. 2010).
Id.

23.

See appendix for lists of states.

24. Elliot v. Cobb, 320 S.W.3d 246,252 (Tenn. 2010) (Koch, J., concurring).
25. Hernandez v. Baucum, 344 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
26. Joseph H. King, Jr., Counting Angels and Weighing Anchors: Per Diem Arguments for
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of the debate: "The use of per diem arguments is a highly controversial
aspect of what is itself probably the most controversial element of personal
27
King
injury tort claims, noneconomic pain and suffering damages."
28
reviews the arguments for and against per diem, but ultimately takes a
stark position, opposing per diem arguments as improper and
manipulative .29 Relying on a 1983 article published in an insurance defense
journal, 30 King asserts that the "[u]se of per diem arguments has been a
significant factor contributinq to the increase in damages for pain and
suffering in modern tort law." 1King suggests that per diem arguments are
an "oblique, or perhaps stealthy" way to exploit the anchoring
3
32
phenomenon, and should thus be proscribed.33 King's unfavorable view of
per diem arguments may be driven by his unfavorable view of noneconomic damages more generally, describing the task of putting a money
value on suffering as illogical.34
In the second article addressing per diem arguments, Martin Totaro
concludes that, "by falsely attributing mathematical certainty where none
exists and ignoring the realities of modern pain management techniques, the
per diem method misleads jurors into arriving at an artificially high
award." 35 Totaro, however, does not identify a lodestar for identifying the
proper level of damages from which his claim of artificiality could be
contrasted. Totaro also speculates that future medical advances could
eliminate the plaintiff's pain, and he refers to evidence that injured persons
may acclimate to the pain. 36
There is only one article that addresses per diem arguments empirically.
McAuliff and Bornstein recruited 180 jury-eligible participants and
presented them with a five-page scenario in which liability was already
determined in favor of the plaintiff.37 They studied "whether different

Noneconomic Personal Injury Tort Damages, 71 TENN. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2003).

27. Id. at 2-3.
28. Id. at 15-16.
29. Id. at 28.
30.

Jeffrey O'Connell & Keith Carpenter, Paymentfor Pain and Suffering Through History, 50

INS. COUNS. J. 411, 411-12 (1983).
31.

King, supra note 26, at 5.

32. Id. at 37.
33. Id. at 49-50.
34. Id. at 11 ("By arbitrarily magnifying awards for pain and suffering, per diem arguments
literally compound the illogic of attempting to monetize pain and suffering into a damages remedy.").
35. Martin V. Totaro, Modernizing the Critique of Per Diem Pain and Suffering Damages,92

VA. L. REV. 289, 324 (2006) (emphasis added).
36. Id.at290-91.
37. Bradley D. McAuliff & Brian H. Bornstein, All Anchors Are Not Created Equal: The Effects
of Per Diem Versus Lump Sum Requests on Pain and Suffering Awards, 34 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 164,
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quantifications of the same damage award request . .. influenced pain and
suffering awards compared to no damage award request." 38 Specifically,
they manipulated the non-economic damage demand by including a demand
for $175,000 lump sum, three different per diem strategies-$10/hour,
$240/day, or $7300/month for 2 years-or no economic demand at all.3 9
They found that the $10 per hour demand and the $175,000 lump sum
demand produced the largest results. 40 The authors speculated that that
jurors took the $10 an hour demand seriously, as it might have sounded
similar to compensation, whereas the daily or monthly rates may have
seemed too high when compared to the juror's own income.41 Finally, the
authors supposed that the $175,000 demand was likely effective because of
anchoring. 4 The study also concluded that at least one per diem demand$10 per hour-increased variability among juror awards when compared to
no demand.43
The McAuliff and Bornstein study is a significant contribution to per
diem research, and it calls into question the presumption that per diem
arguments significantly inflate awards.4 However, because some per diem
arguments influenced jurors much more than others, it is difficult to
45
generalize from these results. This study also did not cross the lump sum
demand with a per diem argument for that amount, which may be the most
powerful and realistic use of the strategy. Finally, because the study
presupposed liability, it is impossible to determine what role per diem
arguments might play in altering binary liability conclusions and thus
overall case value, which is function of both the chance of winning at all
and the average award when the plaintiff does win.46
Although there is no other empirical research on per diem arguments, a
broader body of research on "scaling" provides some insight. Scaling effects
occur when outcomes are influenced by the type of scale that is used (e.g.,

165-66 (2010). See also Kenneth R Laughery, Danielle Paige, Richard N. Bean & Michael S. Wogalter,
Pain and Suffering Awards for Consumer Product Accidents: Effects of Suggesting Day-rate
Information, 45 PROCEEDINGS OF THE HUM. FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS SOC'Y ANN. MEETING 843
(2001) (testing several different jury demands, some of which were per diems, but not investigating
alternative ways to argue for the same demand).

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

McAulliff & Bornstein, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. at 164.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 170-71.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 172.
Id.

44.

Id.

45. Id. at l71.
46. Id. at 173.
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asking for a price in terms of dollars versus cents). Research suggests that
"[s]cale distorts judgments and preferences." 47 Telling someone they
received a thousand bonus points is often perceived as better than telling
them they received ten bonus points, even though the points, and how many
you need in order to redeem them for rewards is entirely arbitrary.48
Similarly, people find cancer risk more threatening when expressed in
49
months than in years.
In an ingeniously simple study, Rachlinksi and his co-authors presented
judges with a criminal case in which guilt was already determined.50 They
asked the judges to sentence the guilty individual. Half of the judges were
asked to sentence the defendant in years and the other half in months.5 1 The
authors found that, "[s]entencing format had an enormous effect on the
judges. The [judges] who sentenced in years provided an average sentence
of 9.7 years, or 115 months. In contrast, the [judges] who sentenced in
months provided an average sentence of only 66.4 months, or 5.5 years." 52
Even experienced decision makers are influenced by how identical
information is scaled, suggesting jurors may be susceptible to similar
manipulations.
One challenge for this vein of research is that although it is possible to
measure how different arguments impact decision makers, it is not possible
to say empirically which outcome is "right." Although we can be sure that
such extraneous factors should not matter, empirical studies cannot say
which level of fear about cancer is more appropriate or whether the sentence
expressed in months or years produces a more just result. Nonetheless, the
scaling literature suggests that per diem arguments, including how they are
expressed, will matter. However, there is very little research examining how

47. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Can Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted
Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695, 711 (2015). See also Daniel Kahneman, David
Schkade & Cass Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages,
16 J. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998) (finding huge variance in awards when unscaled, but much
more coherence among jurors when given a common scale).
48. See Rajesh Bagchi & Xingbo Li, Illusionary Progress in Loyalty Programs: Magnitudes,

Reward Distances, and Step-Size Ambiguity, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 888, 892-95 (2010) (reporting
research in which subjects expressed a greater affinity for a consumer reward program in which points
and prizes were denominated in thousands).
49. See Sucharita Chandran & Geeta Menon, When a Day Means More than a Year: Effects of
Temporal Framingon Judgments of Health Risk, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 375, 384 (2004).
50. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., supra note 47, at 714-18.
51. Id. at 715. Half the judges were instructed as follows: "'Without regard to the sentence
maximum in your own jurisdiction, how many years would you sentence Smith to serve in prison, based
/years.' For the other half, the researchers
on the facts above?' This was followed by a blank labeled '
/months."' Id.
replaced the word 'years' with 'months' and followed this with a blank labeled '

52. Id. at 716.
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per diem arguments operate. As McAuliff and Bornstein put it, "[e]mpirical
research on per diem arguments is surprisingly scant." 53
The "because" effect may also drive jurors' responses to per diem
arguments. There is evidence that even arbitrary justifications might
increase compliance with a request compared to no justification at all. For
example, Langer, Blank, and Chanowitz conducted a study in which people
about to use a public copy machine were approached by an experimenter
asking to use the copy machine first.54 Three different requests were
randomly assigned: 1) "Excuse me, I have 5 ... pages. May I use the Xerox
machine?" 2) "Excuse me, I have 5 ... pages. May I use the Xerox machine,
because I have to make copies?" 3) "Excuse me, I have 5 . . . pages. May I
use the copy machine, because I'm in a rush?"55 The justifications in
Conditions 2 and 3 obviously provide no real information, and thus should
not affect compliance rates, if justifications worked only through this
informational channel. Yet, the study found that 60% complied in Condition
1, while 93-94% complied in Conditions 2 and 3 .s This body of research
might suggest that per diem arguments, to the extent they function as even
a facial justification for an award, might increase the damage award simply
because it fits an intellectual script. Further, to the extent that per diem
arguments are perceived as meaningful information - a valid justification
they should increase compliance with the demand request. Indeed, in
observational studies with real jurors, Shari Diamond and colleagues found
that when plaintiffs backed up their damages demand with specific
evidence, jurors were seven times as likely to accept them.
The phenomenon of anchoring is obviously relevant to lump sum
damage demands, and may be relevant to per diems as well. Many studies
conclude that a successful plaintiff can obtain a higher damage award
simply by offering a higher ad damnum; that is, requesting more money
58
from the jury. Psychologists call this an "anchoring effect," referring to

53. McAulliff & Bornstein, supra note 37.

54. Ellen Langer et al., The Mindlessness of Ostensibly Thoughtful Action: The Role of "Placebic"
Information in InterpersonalInteraction,36 J. PERSONALYTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 635,637 (1978).

55. Id.
56. Id. at 637. The study found that as the number of pages to be copied was increased from five
to twenty, the compliance rate for Condition 2 began to match that of Condition 1, suggesting that once

people had to engage in more thoughtful deliberation, they recognized that a meaningful justification
was really not a justification at all.
57. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Damage Anchors on Real Juries, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.

148, 166 tbl.2 (2011) (12.5% compared to 1.8%).
58. See Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the More You Get:
Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED CoGNIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 521 (1996); John
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when an individual's numerical judgments are inordinately influenced by
an "arbitrary number." 59 Anchors are powerful influences, not only when
they are made obvious, but also when subtly embedded in a more complex
thicket of information.60 Anchoring effects have repeatedly been shown in
the context of jury trials, 61 reaching back at least to the 1950s, when the
62
Chicago Jury Project studied jury responses to a typical car accident case.
63
The study used mock juries who listened to tape-recorded mock trials. The
participants were actual jurors who were on duty at the time.64 Jurors were
exposed to higher and lower damages demands. Across conditions, the
conclusion was that "the higher the [demand by plaintiff] the higher the
verdict."

65

Studies since then have confirmed that as the demand increases, so does
the award-indeed, so much so that one study's title provocatively suggests
that "the more you ask for, the more you get." 66 A few studies suggest that
this effect persists even when anchors are extreme. One study tested
demands ranging from $100 to $1 billion.67 Both the absurdly low and
inordinately high demands produced anchoring effects, pulling verdicts

Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping JurorAttitudes: Effects of Requesting Different Damage Amounts
in PersonalInjury Trials, 129 J. OF SOC.PSYCHOL.491,495 (2001) ("The primary finding of the present
experiment was that when more money was requested for damages . . . the jurors awarded more.").
59. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristicsand Biases, 185

Sci. 1124, 1128-31 (1974).
60. Chapman & Bornstein, supra note 58, at 520 (discussing studies in which anchors, even when
included with a variety of other information, proved powerful).

61. See, e.g., Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744,754
(1959); Barry Markovsky, Anchoring Justice, 51 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 213, 214 (1988); Jane Goodman et
al., Runaway Verdicts or Reasoned Determinations: Mock JurorStrategies in Awarding Damages, 29
JURIMETIRCS J. 285, 291 (1989); Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury
to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SoC'Y R. 513, 521 (1992);
Mollie W. Marti, Anchoring Biases and Corrective Processes in Personal Injury Damage Awards (July
1999) (thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for Ph.D., Graduate College of Iowa) (on
file with author); Edith Greene et al., The Effects of Injury Severity on Jury Negligence Decisions, 23
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 675, 678 (1999); Reid Hastie et al., JurorJudgments in Civil Cases: Effects of
Plaintiffs Requests and Plaintiffs Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 445,

449 (1999); Mollie Marti & Roselle L. Wissler, Be Careful What You Ask For: The Effect of Anchors
on Personal Injury Damage Awards, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 91, 94 (2000); Roselle
Wissler et al., The Impact of Jury Instructions on the Fusion of Liability and Compensatory Damages,
25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 125, 126 (2001); Leslie Ellis, Defense Recommendations, Verdicts and

Awards: Don't Find My Client Liable, But If You Do... (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Illinois) (on file with author).
62. Broeder, supranote 61, at 753.

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 759.
66.
67.

See, e.g., Chapman & Bornstein, supra note 58.
Chapman & Bornstein, supra note 58, at 523.
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towards them." Although one study has suggested that absurdly high
anchors actually decrease damages, 69 one of our previous studies calls this
into question, as it found that high anchors are uniquely resistant to tactics
70
commonly used to challenge the anchor's veracity.
The anchoring effect may apply with equal force to per diem arguments.
In classic behavioral experiments, the anchor was completely arbitrary (e.g.,
a number produced by a spinning wheel or the last digits of a social security
number).7 1 Thus, one might predict that if a plaintiff computes a very large
number of minutes (e.g., 5,000,000) as part of a per diem argument, then it
may anchor the damages award just as if she had proposed a similarly large
lump sum award ($5,000,000). Indeed, Diamond's research team has shown
that a high monetary anchor can backfire, or be muddled through
countervailing effects, if it offends the jury, who sees it as "irrelevant" and
"outrageous." 72 A large number generated through aperdiem argument may
have a strong cognitive anchoring effect on jurors without offending their
conscious sensibilities about a money demand in particular.
Finally, the "fusion effect" is also potentially relevant to both per diem
and anchoring tactics, and the law that regulates them. Fusion is a process
in which the strength of a case influences damage awards despite static
damage evidence or, in reverse, severity of injury influences findings of
liability despite static liability evidence.7 3 The precise mechanism of fusion
74
is unknown, but respected scholars in the area agree that fusion occurs.
Edith Greene, Michael Johns, and Jason Bowman found that jurors allowed
severity of injury to influence findings regarding liability.75 Broeder agreed,
finding that damage awards will generally vary with the strength of the
liability evidence against the defendant, and not solely as a function of the

68. Studies finding that an anchoring effect is boundless arguably conflict with more general
cognitive science literature that suggests that for an anchor to be salient, it must not be so extreme as to
conflict with other scale elements. See, e.g., Barry Markovsky, supra note 62, at 214.

69. See Marti & Wissler, supra note 61.
70. John Campbell et al., Countering the Plaintiffs Anchor: Jury Simulations to Evaluate
Damages Arguments, 101 IOWA L. REV. 543 (2016).
71. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 59.

72. Diamond et al., supranote 57, at 176-78.
73. See, e.g., Marti & Wissler, supranote 61, at 126 (defining "fusion" as the conflation of liability
with damages, or damages with liability); Edith Greene et al., supra note 61, at 690 (finding that jurors
allowed severity of injury to influence findings regarding liability); Ellis, supra note 61 (concluding that
severity of injury influenced damages); Broeder, supra note 61, at 754 (finding a $7,000 difference in
damage awards based on severity of injury when liability facts did not change).
74. See e.g., Edith Greene, On Juries and Damage Awards: The Process of Decisionmaking, 52
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 225, 246 (1989).

75. Edith Greene et al., supra note 61 at 690.
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plaintiffs loss. 6 He found a $7,000 difference in damage awards based on
severity of injury when liability facts did not change.77 It is possible then,
that a per diem argument or a high anchor might make damages seem more
severe, and that this perceived increase in severity might influence
determinations regarding liability.
In sum, the existing literature creates as many questions as it answers.
Only one prior empirical study measures of whether per diem arguments
inflate damages, and they did not interact a per diem argument with a lump
sum demand. And no one has suggested that per diems can impact
determinations of liability. This article begins to fill these holes, providing
insight on both.
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

A. Research Questions
Our study tested five primary research questions.
1. Lump Sum Effects: Will jurors award larger damages when a
plaintiff requests a large specific total amount, even if that amount
is unreasonable?
2. Per Diem Effects: Will jurors award larger damages when the
plaintiff s attorney breaks down the plaintiff s likely time suffering
into a large total number of minutes the plaintiff suffered?
3. Interaction: Will the lump sum and per diem effects interact,
perhaps because the per diem argument justifies the larger demand?
4. Predictability: Will jurors' damages awards become more
predictable (i.e., have less variation) when the plaintiff is allowed
to request a specific award or give a per diem argument for it?
5. Fusion Effects: Will jurors change their binary liability verdicts
based on the type of damages arguments the plaintiff makes?
Our study also estimates the relative strengths of the effects we identify
and suggests how they should impact policy and litigation tactics.
B. Stimulus and Manipulations
We performed an online, vignette-based experiment, in a 2 (lump sum
demand or not) x 2 (per diem argument or not) between-subjects factorial

76.

Broeder, supra note 61, at 754.

77. Id.
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design, as shown in Table 2. All subjects watched a medical malpractice
trial video that lasted roughly 40 minutes. The video included judicial
instructions, opening statements from the plaintiffs and defendant's
attorneys, testimony from expert witnesses about the standard of care in the
case, cross-examination of both experts, closing arguments and jury
instructions.7 8 Participants were randomly assigned to see one of four
different scenarios. Each scenario had or did not have a combination of two
different plaintiffs closing damages arguments. This video was developed
by real physicians serving as writers of the medical scenario and serving as
actors for the expert witnesses, along with an experienced arbitrator
consulting on the jury instructions and serving as the judge. Opening and
closing arguments were written by one of the co-authors, an experienced
trial attorney. Thus, although condensed, the video had a high degree of
verisimilitude.
The scenario in the video concerned a primary care physician's failure
to diagnose a case of lumbar radiculopathy and refer the patient to imaging,
which allegedly would have allowed timely surgery and avoided the
permanent disability the patient now suffers. The primary dispute concerned
whether the physician-defendant met the standard of care when, instead of
ordering imaging, he simply instructed the patient to take over-the-counter
medications and return if the pain got worse. On this point, the evidence
favored the plaintiff strongly, because the parties did not dispute that a peerreviewed national practice guideline specifically provides that when a
patient has two or more signs of neurological impingement (as the plaintiff
did), a physician should order imaging.79
Mock jurors viewed one of the four different plaintiffs closing
arguments.80 In all the variations, the plaintiff and defendant made the same

78. The core trial footage, including jury instructions and two expert witnesses, was taken from a
prior experiment. See Christopher T. Robertson & David V. Yokum, The Effect of Blinded Experts on
Juror Verdicts, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 765, 771 (2012). We modified the trial by adding new
expert testimony that favored the plaintiff and new opening and closing arguments by both sides. We
excluded individuals who had participated in experiments that used this footage in two ways: (1)
individuals that attempted to participate with mTurk identification numbers that had participated in our
previous experiments were automatically excluded, (2) at the end of the video, we asked participants if
they had seen a variation of this trial before and participants who said "yes" were also excluded from
our results. See Eyal Peer et al., Screening Participantsfrom Previous studies on Amazon Mechanical
Turk and Qualtrics (May 2, 2012), available at https://experimentalturk. files.wordpress.com/2012/02/
screening-amt-workers-on-qualtrics-5-2.pdf
79. See generally Roger Chou, et al., Diagnosisand Treatment of Low Back Pain:A Joint Clinical
Practice Guideline from the American College of Physicians and the American Pain Society, 147
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 478 (2007).
80. To see these arguments verbatim, please reference infra Appendix A.
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Table 2. Transcript of Experimental Manipulations in Closing
Arguments, Two Variables Fully Crossed in Four Conditions
i
I

Lump
Sum

No
Lump
Sum

Per diem
[Scenario 1] Assuming Mr.
Stevens lives another 9.5
years, which is about the
average for someone in his
health condition, he will spend
60 minutes an hour, 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week, 52 weeks
a year in pain. That is
4,979,520 minutes in pain. I'm
asking you to award him one
dollar a minute. No rational
person would agree to be paid
a dollar a minute to suffer
Mr.
Stevens
pain,
and
wouldn't take that deal either.
But he has no choice now. So,
do what you can to make this
right. Award him $5,000,000.
[Scenario 3] The law does
not allow me to tell you what I
think you should award, but I
can tell you this. ... Assuming
Mr. Stevens lives another 9.5
years, which is about the
average for someone in his
health condition, he will spend
60 minutes an hour, 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week, 52 weeks
a year. That is 4,979,520
minutes in pain. 4,979,520
minutes of pain that could
have been avoided.

I

No Per diem

[Scenario 2] Award Mr.
Stevens $5,000,000. That's a
fair amount for 9.5 years of
pain. $5,000,000 won't make
his back better, but it will let
him breathe a little easier.

[Scenario 4] The law does
not allow me to tell you what I
think you should award, but I
can tell you this. An expert has
said that my client's average
lifespan is about 9.5 years. So,
you need to award an amount
that will help Mr. Stevens
breathe easier for the rest of
his life. It needs to be an
amount that spread over the
rest of his life will make things
a little better. I trust and know
that you can decide on that
number.
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liability argument and the defendant made the same damages argument. All
conditions mentioned that the plaintiff would suffer for 9.5 years-his life
expectancy. We manipulated two types of plaintiff damages arguments,
lump sum and per diem. This resulted in four different scenarios, as shown
in Table 2. When a lump sum was not given, the attorney explained that this
was because the law did not allow him to do so.
Subjects rendered individual judgments, following pattern jury
instructions asking them to respond "yes" or "no" to the prompt: "Based on
the instructions provided by the judge in the video, do you believe that the
Plaintiff has proved, by the greater weight of the evidence, that the
Defendant committed medical negligence?" The jurors who found
negligence awarded non-economic damages for "pain and suffering," which
had been defined by the judge's instructions. 8 1Economic damages were not
awarded, because the attorneys told the participants that they were not in
dispute. Finally, we asked jurors to "in a sentence or two explain your
answers." 82
C. Respondents
We recruited subjects from the population of workers on Amazon
Mechanical Turk (Mturk) in June 2015 and screened for those that were
"jury eligible," meaning residents of the United States over age 18 who
could read, write, and speak English. Subjects were paid four dollars to
complete the experiment online. All subjects consented in accordance with
IRB requirements. We administered a demographic questionnaire at the
beginning of the survey.
In total, 732 people completed the online experiment. The sample was
more educated, politically liberal, and younger than the population at large.
It was also slightly more male. The race and median income, on the other
hand, was more closely representative of the U.S. Census data.83 Balance

81. Following the pattern jury instructions for Arizona, the judge stated that, "if you find Dr.
Davidson liable to Mr. Stevens, you must then decide the full amount of money that will reasonably and
fairly compensate Mr. Stevens. In this case, the amount of medical expenses and other damages have
been stipulated, but you must decide the amount to compensate Mr. Stevens for the pain, discomfort,
suffering, disability, disfigurement, and anxiety already experienced, and reasonably probable to be
experienced in the future as a result of the injury." See RAJI (Civil) PIDI (5th ed.).
82. We also collected other data not reported here.

83. Specifically, the sample demographics are as follows: 51% male; mean and median age of
twenty-six and thirty-one, respectively; 81% White, 10% African American, 6% Asian, 1% American
Indian, and 2% other; 49% with Bachelor's degree or higher; and 60% lean toward, prefer, or strongly
prefer the Democrats.
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checks did not reveal any differences in demographic compositions across
the four experimental groups; randomization succeeded.
Mturk has become a large and robust platform for social science
research, with proven reliability through the replication of many known
results.84 However, the platform requires great care to ensure meaningful
results. Using participants' unique identifiers, we excluded anyone who had
participated in previous studies that use the same video. We paid at a rate
near the national minimum wage, which was sufficient to recruit enough
workers to complete data collection in a matter of hours, minimizing any
risk that workers could communicate with one another on chat boards,
thereby "unblinding" the experiment.85 We did not include "attention
check" questions as a method for disqualifying respondents, because that
could increase the risk of false positives in our experiment. We also lack a
gold-standard measure for how much attention real jurors pay. We did
however, screen respondents with poor worker reputation scores (<85%),
which indicates a propensity to cheat on Mturk tasks, and warned workers
about the risk of nonpayment in our study as a deterrent.86 We also measured
how long respondents remained on videos, excluding those who took less
time than the video length as well as those who took extraordinary amounts
of time, suggesting they may have left the monitor and attended to other
tasks. Finally, we required participants to enter qualitative responses to
explain their decisions (as real jurors would do in deliberations), and we
reviewed data for non-responsive answers.
To enhance the generalizability of the primary experiment, we also ran
the experiment on a convenience sample of several hundred law students at
two universities. Specifically, we wanted to ensure that the results were
replicable. We also wanted to investigate whether the effects we saw would
differ among those with increased legal literacy. In total, 179 students
participated, including 61% who were first year law students participating
prior to the beginning of substantive coursework (making them more similar
to layperson jurors). The sample was too small to provide statistically
significant results; however, it served as general confirmation for our
results. We briefly report these results after the primary experiment.

84. See also sources cited infra notes 102-103.
85. See generallyEyal Peer et al., Reputationas a Sufficient Conditionfor Data Quality on Amazon
Mechanical Turk,45 BEHAV.RES.METHODS 1023 (2013).

86. Id.
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III. RESULTS
We report individual juror results in Table 3. To reduce the effect of
extreme outliers-which in the real world would be moderated by other
jurors in the deliberation process or ultimately by the judge with
remittitur-we adopted the common statistical technique of transforming
all awards above $5 million to $5 million. 8 7 In addition, because our sample
set did not follow a normal distribution, we applied a bootstrapping
algorithm to create 95% confidence intervals for different treatments.88
Confidence intervals allow the analyst to understand the range of actual
values that are consistent with the observed data; these are values that
cannot be "ruled out." Specifically, for each condition we resampled our
individual responses to create a new simulated data set of the same size and
calculated the mean for this set. We did this 10,000 times to arrive at 10,000
means. We then used the bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) method to
determine the upper and lower bounds for a 95% confidence interval.
Finally, as shown in the Appendix, we performed multivariate regressions,
with and without demographic controls, to perform hypothesis tests
comparing effects and to check for confounds. The p-values discussed
below are from these regressions.

87. There were only one or two awards in excess of $5 million for each condition. See Appendix
B (histograms depicting frequency of different damages awards).
88. Instead of the upside down "U" shaped normal distribution, the scenarios show a strong cluster
at $5 million with a significant number of substantially smaller damages awards. The scenarios without
large lump sum demands also have numerous smaller awards. All scenarios show one award above $5
million. See infra Appendix B. For non-normal distributions, a bootstrapping algorithm is an appropriate
method for calculating confidence intervals because it uses the observed distribution rather than
assuming normality. See generally, BRADLEY EFRON & ROBERT TIBSHIRANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE BOOTSTRAP 45, 113, 183 (1993).

89. Id.
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A. Effects on Damages
When examining damages, we excluded those observations where mock
jurors found in favor of the defendant and found no liability. For example,
in Table 3, we had 190 participants that viewed Scenario 1, but only 116
found the defendant liable and their responses were used for our damages
analysis. (We include all responses, including those that found no liability,
in other analyses below.)
Figure 1 below illustrates the damages results by scenario. Average
damages in Scenarios I and 2, where the plaintiffs attorney asked for $5
million, were $2,042,006 and $1,887,500 respectively. In contrast, when the
plaintiff did not make the large lump sum demand, average damages
decreased significantly. Specifically, in Scenarios 3 and 4 average damages
were $714,317 and $473,489 respectively. The 95% confidence intervals
depicted in Figure 1 show similar results and illustrate the difference
between damage awards in the presence and absence of a large lump sum
demand. Consistent with the prior literature, we found that large lump sum
demands have a strong anchoring effect on damages awards.
Figure 1. Mean Damages by Experimental Condition with 95%
Bootstrap Confidence Interval (in thousands)

$2,300
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$1,800

$800
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We can isolate the specific effects of the large lump sum demand by
looking at the results of our standard regression, presented in the Appendix.
In our basic model, the award without the large lump sum demand was
$496,389, which is similar to the unadjusted value shown in Figure 1
($473,489).90 When the plaintiff asked for $5 million (Scenarios 1 and 2),
that argument increased the damages award by $1,368,211 or 276% (p <
.001), again, similar to the effect shown in Figure 1. These results did not
change significantly when we included additional variables in different
models. 91 Thus, we confirm our first hypothesis-mock jurors respond to
large, even unreasonable damages demands, by issuing higher damages
verdicts.
Recall that, to create the per diem argument, we added a few sentences
to the plaintiffs closing argument that characterized the plaintiffs
remaining expected 9.5-year life span in terms of 4,979,520 minutes. The
manipulation lasted seconds and was an extremely small portion of the
approximately forty minutes of trial footage.
As shown in Figure 1, average awards with per diem arguments in
Scenarios 1 and 3 were $2,042,006 and $714,317 (Lump sum/PerDiem and
PerDiem Only, respectively). These results were nominally higher than the
averages in the scenarios where the per diem argument was not made. In
comparison without the per diem argument, the average damages awards
were $1,887,500 and $473,489 (scenario 2 "Lump Sum Only" and scenario
4 "Neither").
Our regression analysis was consistent with these results suggesting that
per diem arguments increased damages by $195,963. However, these results
were not statistically significant (p = .2). Thus, although we suspect per
diem arguments do increase damages, we had insufficient power to confirm
our second hypothesis with respect to damages outcomes. In contrast, the
per diem argument did have statistically significant effects on both liability
and expected value outcomes, discussed below.
We also compared the effects of the large lump sum demand against the
per diem argument, head-to-head. The large lump sum demand results in
dramatically higher damages than the per diem argument, increasing
damage awards by between $770,381 and $1,583,994.
Aside from the average damages, the variability in damages is also an
important consideration for risk-adverse litigants and policymakers who

90.

See infra Appendix B, tbl.1 (Basic Model). The analysis does not differ significantly when we

added additional variables to our analysis (Basic +Edu Model and All Model).
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favor predictability in outcomes for the sake of due process. Table 4 shows
both the traditional standard deviation and the standard deviation as a
percentage of the mean (also known as the "coefficient of variation"), for
per diem and large lump sum arguments. The large lump sum demand
increased the standard deviation but reduced the coefficient of variation,
which is relative to the average amount of the award. In other words, the
range of awards was larger with the lump sum demand, spanning from zero
to more than $5 million (absolute variability). But when you compare this
variability to the average award-measured by calculating the standard
deviation as a percentage of the mean-the lump sum demands produce
lower relative variability. The standard deviation as a percentage of mean
was around 90% for both the large lump sum scenarios and 158% and 150%
for the scenarios without large lump sum arguments. In contrast, the per
diem argument did not affect variability.
In sum, the results show that our third hypothesis is also true. Some
arguments do appear to reduce variability. In particular, when plaintiffs
provide a specific damage request in the form of a large lump sum demand,
relative variability of damages is reduced.
Table 4. Standard Deviation and Bootstrapped Confidence Interval of
Damages by Experimental Condition, With Standard Deviation as
Percentage of Mean
Scenario
Lump Sum +
Per Diem
Lump Sum
Only
Per Diem
Only

Standard Deviation (SD)
[Confidence Interval]
1,835,123
[1,673,651-1.983,525]
1,702,147
[1,506,029-1,885,025]
1,119,861
[808,406-1,491,496]

Neither

710,552

[471,986-1,207,033]

SD as % Mean
90.0%

150.1%

B. Liability Determinations
We also assessed what effect, if any, large lump sum and per diem
arguments had on binary liability determinations. Table 5 breaks out
plaintiff win rates based on the damages argument that the plaintiff
advanced, pooling the two per diem conditions (Lump Sum/Per Diem and
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PerDiem Only) against the two non-per diem conditions (Lump Sum Only
and Neither).
Surprisingly, per diem arguments increased the plaintiffs chances of
prevailing. Mock jurors found liability 59.9% of the time when the plaintiff
made a per diem argument. In contrast, mock jurors only found liability in
5 0.9% of the cases when the plaintiff did not make the per diem argument.92
These differences were statistically different (p =.036, using chi-square
test). Thus, we disproved our fourth hypothesis. The plaintiffs chance of
prevailing increased when his damages were characterized using per diem
arguments.
Table 5. Binary Liability Outcomes by Presence of Per Diem
Argument
Plaintiff
Prevails
No Per Diem1811

Defendant
Prevails

188

181

50.9%
214
59.0%

49.1%
149
41.0%

p =.036
We are unable to say why per diem arguments affected liability, and our
study was not designed to investigate the mechanism. We gathered
information regarding jurors' certainty as to liability. After rendering binary
judgments, we asked the participants to rate the evidence on a scale 1
(certainly not medical negligence) to 6 (certainly medical negligence). We
examined this data to see whether per diem arguments created more juror
certainty about liability. We detected no such effect. (chi-square .1466).
C. Effects on Case Value
Finally, the expected case value takes into account both the defense
94
verdicts and the verdicts for the plaintiff resulting in damage awards. This
dependent variable-which includes all the data, with defense verdicts
counted as zeros-allows us to assess the relative strength of the effects

92. The breakdown by scenario can be found in Table 1.
93. The p value (p=.1466) results from a likelihood ratio test comparing ordinal regression of the
rating on both large lump sums and per diem arguments to the null model with an intercept alone.
94. Awards over $5 million were transformed to $5 million.

2017]

TIME IS MONEY

27

observed above. This dependent variable is the most important for rational
litigants, policymakers, and courts concerned with aggregate liability costs.
We also have greater power for these tests than for the damages tests, which
excluded those observations that found no liability.
For this purpose, we again pooled the data by presence of either lump
sum or per diem, to test those trial tactics as such. As shown on the left side
of Figure 2 below, when the plaintiff asked for $5 million, expected value
jumped significantly. The average individual damage award jumped from
$320,759 to $1,104,794. Thus, the lump sum case expected value was 344%
of the case expected value without the lump sum demand.
Our regression analysis isolated the specific effect of the lump sum
argument and found that it increased the case expected value by $779,029
in our experiment (p<.001).9 That is a 370% increase. Thus, we confirm
that large lump sum demands also strongly increase case expected value.
Althouh we did not find statistically significant effects of per diem on
damages,9 we did detect such effects on the case expected value.97 The right
side of Figure 2 shows how the case expected value increased when the
plaintiff used aperdiem argument. The average case expected value jumped
from $601,444 to $845,388. Thus, the per diem award was 141% of the
award without per diem.
The regression analysis provides a more precise estimate of the per diem
effects. The per diem argument increased the case expected value by
$226,757 (p< .05), largely through the binary verdict mechanism. That
represents a 108% increase. Thus, we can confirm our hypothesis with
respect to case expected values. The per diem argument increased case
expected value, but in an amount substantially smaller than we observed
with the large lump sum.

95. The p value was calculated using bootstrapping.
96. See supra Section 11(A).
97. We obtained statistically significant results for case expected value (CEV) and not damages
for two reasons. First, CEV incorporates both liability and damage determinations, which are two distinct
mechanisms of action. Second, our sample size was larger for the per diem analysis, since it included
the defense verdicts as zeroes.
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Figure 2. Case Expected Value by Presence of Lump Sum versus Per
Diem Arguments with 95% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals (in
thousands)
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As a whole, our results revealed the following:
1. Requesting a large lump sum award dramatically increases
award amounts.
2. Per diem awards did not increase damage awards at a
statistically significant level, though they may trend in that
direction.
3. Per diem awards do not interact with large lump sum demands
to further enhance awards at statistically significant level,
though they may trend in that direction.
4. Lump sum demands reduce the relative variability of awards.
Per diem arguments do not do so detectably.
5. Per diem arguments increase the win rate for plaintiffs at a
statistically significant level.
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D. Replication with Student Sample
In addition to our large, diverse online research population, we also
sought to replicate our key findings with another population. We recruited
179 students at two law schools (New York University School of Law and
Sturm College of Law, University of Denver). Using the same video stimuli
and online response software, we randomized the students to two of the
conditions above, those with and without a per diem argument (Scenario 3
vs. Scenario 4). We eliminated Scenarios 1 and 2 for simplicity.
In the student sample, the plaintiff prevailed only 52.4% of the time in
the control group without the per diem argument and 57.7% of the time with
the per diem case argument. 98 Although we cannot rule out the null
hypothesis based on this data alone, this trend towards per diems increasing
the win rate is consistent with our finding in our full-scale study.
On average, students in the control group not seeing the per diem
arguments and finding in favor of the plaintiff awarded $705,442 compared
to $775,268 with the per diem argument.99 This is consistent with our earlier
finding. While per diem arguments likely do not substantially increase
damage awards, they may have some modest advantage for plaintiffs.
IV. LIMITATIONS

Our study had several limitations. First, although our randomized
experiment allowed us to isolate causal effects for a particular type of case,
it required us to choose a specimen case and exemplars of the manipulations
we tested. In particular, we used a case that was a close call on liability, with
plaintiff win-rates just over 50%. Much stronger or much weaker plaintiff
cases may show different effects. However, since most cases that are tried
are close, our study should prove useful in many jury trials. Relatedly, our
experiment only exposed mock jurors to one example of a lump sum
demand and one example of a per diem argument. The effects we tested may
either be moderated or enhanced by selecting different numbers or per diem
strategies (e.g. hours or days instead of minutes).100 Still, we can expect that

98. The 95% confidence interval for the control group is 41% to 63%, while the interval for per
diem is 46% to 69%, p=0.61.
99. The bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for the control group is $493,620 to $1,104,998,
and for per diem it is $511,837 to $1,220,995, p-0.59.
100. See Campbell et al., supra note 70, at 554-55 (comparing the effects of large unreasonable
demands with a small demand).
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plaintiffs' lawyers will select large anchors and large lump sums. Our use
of nearly equal numbers in both conditions (each approximately $5 million)
allows us to hold potential anchoring constant, while exploring the potential
differing informational content delivered by a per diem compared to a large
lump sum.
Second, we used a forty-minute abridged civil trial for our experimental
stimulus. The condensed stimulus allowed us to utilize a randomized,
controlled, trial-experiment design, which is the gold-standard for scientific
research.10 ' Still, there are reasonable concerns about external validity. One
might expect that the large lump sum or per diem effects would be smaller
if outweighed by more trial evidence. Still, since this particular
manipulation is necessarily right at the end of the case, it will likely be
salient to jurors, regardless of how much they saw before. Moreover,
compared to other research performed with a few hundred words of text as
the stimulus, our forty-minute video stimulus, complete with jury
instructions, witnesses, and arguments, is at the high end of the range of
external validity.
Third, we did not study real jurors and could not allow respondents to
deliberate together to reach collective verdicts. Instead, we used an online
population that "is at least as representative of the U.S. population as
traditional subject pools"' 02 and where known experimental results have
been replicated.1 0 3 However, as noted, that subject pool is slightly more
liberal, educated, young, and wealthy than the population as a whole. It also
measures only those who have access to the internet. In response to these
04
potential limitations, we took several methodological precautions.1
Nonetheless, online respondents may be more easily distracted from the trial
compared to real jurors. It may be that real jurors are more earnest in their
efforts to provide meaningful responses or that real jurors determine liability
and damages differently, knowing that the outcomes will impact real
individuals and companies. Our factorial design-which manipulates two
variables, both in the closing arguments and shows a large effect for one
variable (lump sum) and no effect on the other (for damages)-repudiates
any simplistic suggestion that participants were systematically

101. See generally, BLINDING AS A SOLUTION To BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE,
FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW 41-128 (Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim, eds., 2016)
(discussing the history, ethics, and efficacy of randomized controlled trials in biomedical science).
102. Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT AND
DECISIONMAKING411,411,414 (2010).
103. Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research:
Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 362-63 (2012).
104. See supra note 82.
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unresponsive. Finally, our replication of our primary results with a
convenience sample of students further ameliorates concerns that our null
results maybe peculiar to a particular subject pool. Finally, individual juror
verdict preferences have been shown to be predictive for collective jury
outcomes, which minimizes concerns about the lack of deliberations.'os
V. IMPLICATIONS

Notwithstanding the limitations mentioned in the previous section, our
study suggests several important implications for advocacy and policy.
First, our study showed that a plaintiff s per diem argument on damages
increased the plaintiff s likelihood of prevailing on liability. This finding is
remarkable, as it is one not predicted by the courts or commentators, who
have instead focused on the likely effect on damages.' 06 One explanation is
that mock jurors took more seriously the gravity of the defendant's alleged
negligence when the injury was illustrated in this way, or perhaps simply
became more sympathetic for the plaintiff when pondering his livedexperience over time. Alternatively, it is possible that respondents found the
plaintiff and his attorney more credible because the attorney offered this
additional reason for a verdict, a dynamic related to the "because" effect
discussed above. 07 These hypothesized mechanisms are not particularly
worrisome from a policy perspective; they do not suggest that the per diem
argument is causing the jury to behave irrationally. Of course, we generally
cannot say whether a finding of liability in any given case is good or bad.
However, in this case, we do have such a lodestar, since the defendant
admittedly violated a national treatment guideline as to the standard of care.
Given that the win rate was below what the evidence likely supports, our
study suggests that the effect may have been salutary. At a minimum, they
suggest that lawyers who are given the option to use per diem arguments
should do so.
Second, scholars and courts critical of per diem arguments have
presumed that they will produce drastically inflated awards and are
therefore prejudicial. The behavioral science literature further supports the
hypothesis that presenting the jury with a number in the millions of minutes

105. See, e.g., Diamond & Casper, supra note 61, at 546 ("[T]he median [individual juror award
pre-deliberation] is the best single predictor of the jury's final verdict .....
106. See, e.g., McAuliff&Bornstein,supra note 37.
107. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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would tend to anchor damages awards upwards. 08 Our study showed that
impacts on damages are smaller than predicted, and in fact, not statistically
distinguishable from zero. Thus, although per diems appear to be helpful to
plaintiffs, the notion that they exploit irrational anchoring effects, and thus
should be prohibited, is unsupported.
Third, and relatedly, it is unsurprising that the effects of a large lump
sum demand were massive. Multiple studies already confirmed this.
Nonetheless, the finding is useful here to put in context the alleged problem
with per diem arguments. The large lump sum dramatically overwhelmed
any per diem effect, suggesting that lump sum arguments should be the real
target for reformers, if any reform is required at all. Nonetheless, we caution
that there is a profound problem of knowing what the "correct" amount of
non-economic damages may be in any given case. We suspect that jurors
who are not familiar with transactions in the millions of dollars may well
underestimate pain and suffering, and guess somewhat randomly if the
plaintiff is not allowed to make a specific request.
Fourth, if reducing the variability of jury awards is desirable, our study
suggests that allowing lump sum demands is helpful, whereas per diem
arguments may not produce the same effect. The takeaway is that leaving
jurors to attempt to figure out non-economic damage awards without a
specific damage request results in in more damages variability.
CONCLUSION

Most articles and many courts assume that per diem arguments
powerfully impact damage awards. Some go so far as to suggest that per
diem arguments manipulate jurors irrationally and account for astronomical
awards. Our study does not support these positions. Instead, the impact on
damage awards is nominal, and per diem arguments do not significantly
alter the variability of awards.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs' lawyers have been wise to use per diem
arguments when allowed to do so, since our data shows them enhancing the
expected value of cases. Strikingly, our study reveals an unforeseen
mechanism. Per diem arguments increase the likelihood that jurors will find
liability at all. In cases like ours, where the defendant arguably should be
liable for violating an objective measure of the standard of care, the per
diem argument is thus on the side of justice. We have only suggested some
potential mechanisms for how per diem arguments increase liability

108.

See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 59.
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findings, by effecting perceptions of injury severity. Alternatively, or
additionally, per diem arguments may increase the credibility of the parties
who makes them, or increase juror attention to details of the case. Further
study is required.
If a modest increase in liability findings is the only effect of per diem
arguments, it is not clear that courts should proscribe the practice. Indeed,
it would be difficult to distinguish this form of argument from other
permissible ways in which attorneys try to make the case comprehensible
and meaningful for jurors.
APPENDIXES

A. Survey of State Non-Economic DamagesLaw
The following states allow lump sum demands and per diem calculations
that support them.
1. Alabama1 09

2. Alaska"o
3. California"

109. The Supreme Court of Alabama did not provide much reasoning in its opinion holding that the
per diem argument is proper. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Kines, 160 So. 2d 869, 876 (Ala. 1963). The
court held that it was not an error for the judge to allow the plaintiff to use a chart that argued past and
future pain and suffering at $15 and $5 per day respectively, and totaled a request from the jury of
$74,525 for pain and suffering. Id. at 875. Alabama requires that the trial judge give a warning to the
jury that the per diem argument is merely the belief of the plaintiff, and that it is free to accept or reject
it. Id. at 876.
110. The Alaskan case authorizing the use of per diem arguments is unique in that the defendant
was appealing the judge's use of a per diem formula in calculating damages. Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434
P.2d 665, 675 (Alaska 1967). The judge determined that the plaintiff was entitled to future pain and
suffering damages for thirty-six years at a rate of $20 per day for fifty-two days of the year, and $3 for
the remaining days of the year. Id. The court found nothing unfair about the court's use of the formula
in determining damages, and that the real question was "whether the total sum is reasonable or not,
regardless of how it was arrived at." Id. at 676. A further interesting point of Beaulieu, is that the
defendant argued in the alternative, that if damages are calculated on a per diem basis, then that award
should be reduced to present value. Id. at 676. The court rejected this argument, citing a state rule that
when damages are for future earning capacity, they should not be reduced to present value. Id. at 67677.
Ill. In California, the per diem argument is the right of the plaintiff after the California Supreme
Court specifically rejected leaving its admissibility to the discretion of the trial court. Beagle v. Vasold,
417 P.2d 673, 682 (Cal. 1966). In Beagle, the trial judge denied the plaintiff the ability to mention a
lump sum or per diem argument to the jury, reasoning it was not in evidence. Id. at 674. While first
acknowledging the difficulty of placing a value to pain and suffering, the court then found error in the
trial judge's denial of the lump sum argument, as had been the practice in California for a long time. Id.
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4. Coloradoll 2

at 675-76.
In its approval of per diem arguments, the California Supreme Court specifically rejected the
Botta ruling. Id. at 678. In the court's view, the Botta ruling was flawed. In that case, that the plaintiff
sues for money, the defense opposes an award of money, juries award money, but the court's holding
forbids any reference to money. Id. (quoting Recent Cases, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 522 (1958)). The
California Supreme Court agreed with Botta in that these arguments by counsel are not found in
evidence, but disagreed about whether they can be inferred from evidence. Id. Attorneys are "permitted
to discuss all reasonable inferences from the evidence," and since the jury must necessarily infer the
value of pain and suffering, attorneys are able to discuss that inference. Id. Furthermore, the court found
it "paradoxical to hold that damages in totality are inferable from the evidence but that when this sum is
divided into segments representing days, months or years, the inference vanishes." Id.
The Beagle court also specifically rejected Botta's contention that a per diem argument invaded the
province of the jury. Id. The court likened it to the plaintiff asking the jury to determine liability, as both
must come from inferences. Id. The court gives a lot of credit to juries, stating:
Nor should we conclude as a matter of law that a jury will ignore the court's instructions to
award a reasonable amount as compensation for the plaintiffs pain and suffering and that it
will inevitably choose an indefensible course of slavishly follow counsel's suggestions on
damages, merely because he asserts in argument that such compensation should be measure on

a "perdiem" basis.
Id. at 678-79 (emphasis added).
As for the Botta court's concern that the per diem arguments will lead to excessive damage
awards, California sees no concern at all. Id. at 679. The court points out that the number of cases where
a jury returns the exact amount requested by the plaintiff is small. Id. Even when they do, "the verdict
is not excessive as a matter of law." Id. at 680. Also, it should not concern the courts if the per diem
arguments result in larger awards, as long as those awards are still reasonable. Id. If the argument leads
to an excessive verdict, the trial and appellate courts have the power to reduce unreasonable awards. Id.
The court uses the same line of reasoning to deal with concerns over the plaintiff use of small units of
time, such as seconds. Id. The jury is tasked with coming up with a reasonable award for pain and
suffering, and the per diem argument is just one way of helping them determine what is reasonable. Id.
Beagle also discussed the credibility factor as a deterrent to plaintiffs seeking absurd awards
from juries. Id. at 680-81. In asking for too much, the plaintiff's counsel undermines his entire case, and
runs the risk of defense counsel pointing out the unreasonableness of the argument. Id. at 681. Also, the
court held that trial judges should instruct juries that such arguments are not evidence, and that they are
"not bound by any particular method of calculation in assessing damages for pain and suffering." Id.
112. Colorado has an interesting history to its rule allowing per diem damages. In 1963, when the
Colorado Supreme Court held that per diem arguments are permissible, it based its opinion largely on
the fact that it was "[an integral part of the instructions given by the trial court in this state to the jury
contains the amount of compensation sought by the plaintiff for pain and suffering." Newbury v. Vogel,
379 P.2d 811, 814 (Colo. 1963). Therefore, "[tihe per diem argument is nothing more than a course of
reasoning suggested by the plaintiff for translating pain and suffering into reasonable compensation ...
." Id. (emphasis added). Colorado seemed to overrule Newbury in 1973, when the Colorado Jury
Instructions were changed so that the jury would no longer be instructed on the amount the plaintiff

requested in its complaint. Rodrigue v. Hausman, 519 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Colo. App. 1974). The trial
judge in Rodrigue had ruled that the plaintiff would not be allowed to argue specific dollar amounts, nor
a per diem argument under the new instructions. Id. However, the Court of Appeals of Colorado held
that both the lump sum and per diem arguments were admissible. Id. The jury instruction was only one
of the reasons the court in Newbury held the arguments proper. Id. The others being that "the per diem
argument is nothing more than a course of reasoning suggested by the plaintiff for translating pain and
suffering into reasonable compensation," and that there is no possibility for jurors to confuse the
argument with evidence, because "juries in this jurisdiction are always instructed that arguments of
counsel are not evidence ..... Id. (quoting Newbury, 379 P.2d at 814) (emphasis added).
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5. Connecticut13
6. District of Columbia
7. Floridal1 4

113. Connecticut has a statutory right to present a lump sum or per diem argument to the jury. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-216b (West 2014). The statute survived a validity challenge in Bartholomew v.
Schweizer. 587 A.2d 1014 (Conn. 1991). The first challenge was under separation of powers because
the statute overrules prior Connecticut Supreme Court holdings to the contrary. Id. at 1018 (citing
Carchidi v. Rodenhiser, 551 A.2d 1249 (Conn. 1989)) (plaintiff may not argue lump sum); Pool v. Bell,
551 A.2d 1254 (Conn. 1989) (plaintiff may not present a per diem argument). The court held that the
statute was not "intended to abrogate the power of the court to discipline attorneys or to control their
statements during oral argument as justice may require." Id. at 1019. The courts retain the right to
monitor closing arguments, and give curative instructions if necessary to prevent prejudice. Id. at 1020.
The judge can declare a mistrial or "set aside a verdict if counsel's comments were so prejudicial that
no curative instruction could preserve the parties' right to a fair trial." Id. Further, the court held that
statute does not violate the separation of powers, because it is a public policy issue, which is under the
authority of the legislature. Id.
The defendants in Bartholomew also challenged the statute under their right to trial by an
impartial jury, asserting that such arguments are "so prejudicial that no curative instruction can ensure a
fair result after an attorney has posited such a value." Id. at 1021. The court responded by saying that in
most cases, the curative instruction is enough to preserve the defendant's rights, and "[i]f in any case the
statements of counsel so exceed the bounds of propriety that no curative instruction can remove their
taint, the court retains the power and duty to declare a mistrial or to set aside a jury's verdict." Id.
114. While the lower appellate courts in Florida had been approving of plaintiffs' use of per diem
arguments since the early 1960's, the Supreme Court of Florida did not directly weigh in until 1974. See
Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 80 So. 2d 662, 662 (Fla. 1957) (Supreme Court of Florida held
a verdict for the exact amount requested by plaintiff's counsel whom had used a per diem argument was
not excessive without addressing the propriety of the argument used). In Allred v. Chittenden Pool
Supply, Inc., the Supreme Court of Florida held that the per diem argument, "may be helpful to the jury
in its final deliberations . . . . [while the argument] is not unfettered and is not evidence." 298 So. 2d
361, 365 (Fla. 1974). The court held that there was no prejudice or fundamental error, citing the
plaintiff's attorney's own warning that the per diem argument was not evidence, and the judge's
instructions. Id. at 366.
The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, generally discussed the arguments for
and against per diem arguments, before ruling them proper in Ratner v. Arrington. 111. So. 2d 82, 8889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). The arguments against being: (1) no evidentiary basis; (2) counsel cannot
suggest the lump sum, so they cannot use a per diem argument; (3) attorneys are not allowed to testify;
(4) juries will consider the argument evidence, leading to excessive awards. Id. The court also pointed
out a very interesting fifth argument against the use, stating that:
[F]ollowing such argument by plaintiff, a defendant is prejudiced by being placed in a position
of attempting to rebut an argument having no basis in the evidence, with the result that if he
does not answer plaintiffs argument in kind he suffers its effect on the jury, but if defendant
does answer in kind he thereby implies approval of the per diem argument for damage
determination for pain and suffering. Id (emphasis added).
The reasoning for the use of the per diem argument, as pointed out by the court was: (1) juries
need some guidance in their determinations; (2) juries should not award damages on a "blind guess"; (3)
there is no real danger of misleading the jury; (4) that because the jury makes the inference from
evidence, the argument is also based in the evidence; (5) it is only a suggestion of one possible method
the jury may use in determining the award; (6) per diems are only illustration and suggestion; (7) judicial
instructions reduce the possibility of the argument being taken as evidence; (8) defendant's counsel may
suggest his own belief of the amount of damages. Id. at 89.

36

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8. Georgia

[VOL. 95:1

15

9. Hawaii' 6
10. Idahol 7
11. Indiana'18
12. Iowa" 9

115. Georgia has statutory authority for lump sum arguments that provides "counsel shall be
allowed to argue the worth or monetary value of pain and suffering to the jury; provided, however, that
any such argument shall conform to the evidence or reasonable deductions from the evidence in the
case." GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-184 (West 2014). A per diem argument is also proper "provided such
argument is within the bounds of reasonable deduction from the evidence in the case." Hardwick v.

Price, 152 S.E.2d 905, 908 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966). The court agreed with the reasoning in Beagle "that the
suggestion of a sum for damages can have no foundation in the evidence." Id. (citing Beagle v. Vasold,

417 P. 2d 673, (Cal. 1966)). Also, the court found it "paradoxical to hold that damages in totality are
inferable from the evidence but when this sum is divided into segments representing days, months, or
years, the inference vanishes." Id. Thus, plaintiff's statement in closing that "the hourly worth of the
plaintiffs pain and suffering should be as much as the price of a measly bottle of Coca-Cola was not,
under the facts of this case, an unreasonable deduction from the evidence ..... Id.
116. Hawaii has statutory authority for lump sum and per diem arguments that provides
[i]n all actions for damages for personal injuries or death the parties or their counsel shall be
entitled to argue the extent of damages claimed or disputed in terms of suggested formulas for
the computation of damages or by way of other illustration, and shall be entitled to state in
argument the amount of damages the party believes appropriate. HAw. REV. STAT. § 63 5-52

(West 2014).
117. In the latest opinion on the subject, the Idaho Supreme Court has found that "[pier diem
arguments are allowed in Idaho as long as counsel does not employ unfair, misleading, or inflammatory

tactics in his use of figures." Tucker v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 603 P.2d 156, 161 (Idaho 1979) (citing
Meissner v. Smith, 494 P. 2d 567 (Idaho 1972)). The court held that because plaintiffs counsel and the
trial court had properly informed the jury that they were not bound by plaintiffs argument, no
inflammatory tactics were used. Id. The judge's instruction to the jury stated that "what counsel asked
for in their arguments was no criteria for measure of damages sustained. The opinion or conclusion of
counsel as to what damages should be awarded should not influence you unless it is sustained by the
evidence . . . ." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Indiana allows per diem arguments. In holding that such arguments are permissible, the
Appellate Court of Indiana cited an earlier Supreme Court of Indiana case as authorizing such arguments.

S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bone, 180 N.E.2d 375, 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 1962) (citing N.Y. Cent. R. Co. v.
Milhiser, 106 N.E.2d 453, 460 (Ind. 1952)). Milhiser is interesting in that the trial court sustained the
defendant's objection to the use of a chart that was essentially a per diem argument. N.Y. Cent. R. Co.

v. Milhiser, 106 N.E.2d 453, 460 (Ind. 1952). The judge denied the defendants motion to dismiss because
the chart had briefly been exposed to the jury. Id. In affirming the trial court's decision, the Supreme
Court of Indiana stated that the chart "contained nothing that the attorney was not authorized to discuss
and probably did discuss in his argument." Id.
119. In Corkery v. Greenberg, the Supreme Court of Iowa approved of per diem arguments. 114
N.W.2d 327, 332 (Iowa 1962). The court held such arguments are "nothing more than a suggestion of a
course of reasoning from the evidence of pain and disability to the award." Id. The court found no reason
to allow a lump sum argument, and not the per diem, pointing out that an argument for an unreasonable
amount of damages would become more apparent if presented in a per diem argument. Id. The Corkery
rule was upheld in Miller v. Rohling, where the plaintiff made a per diem argument on the stand in a
bench trial, testifying to what she believed she was entitled to per hour for damages. 720 N.W.2d 562,
570 (Iowa 2006). The court also approved of the judge's use of a per diem formula in calculating the
damages to be awarded. Id.
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Kansasl2 0
Kentuckyl 2 1
Louisiana22
Michigan' 2 3

120. Kansas originally did not allow per diem arguments. Caylor v. Atchison, 374 P.2d 53, 58 (Kan.
1962). In Caylor, the court reasoned that per diem arguments are "speculation of counsel unsupported
by evidence," and "amounted to the giving of testimony by counsel . . . ." Id. The jury in that case had
specifically requested to see the chart used in the plaintiffs summation, which suggested to the court
that they viewed it as evidence. Id. Seven years later, the Kansas Supreme Court modified Caylor, to
allow for per diem arguments without specific sums attached. Timmerman v. Schroeder, 454 P.2d 522,
527 (Kan. 1969). In overturning the jury verdict, the Supreme Court of Kansas cited in part the judge's
denial of plaintiff attorney's use of a chart that showed life expectancy in total years, total months and
total weeks without affixing a dollar figure of damages. Id. The court held that such a chart was not

barred by the Caylor decision. Id.
The Supreme Court of Kansas overturned the Caylor decision completely in 1997. Wilson v.
Williams, 933 P.2d 757,761 (Kan. 1997). In Wilson, the court found inconsistent the current state of the
rule, which allowed plaintiffs to argue life expectancy in months, weeks, and days, and also to argue a
lump sum of damages to be awarded, but they could not combine the two. Id. at 760. The court also
pointed out that if a jury were to calculate damages on a per diem basis on their own, the court would
not overturn that verdict. Id. at 761. Furthermore, jurors were always instructed that arguments by
attorneys were not to be regarded as evidence. Id. at 760. Also, the court held that trial judges should
give the instruction that opening and closing arguments are not evidence, and "that there is no
mathematical formula to determine nonpecuniary damages." Id. at 761.

121. Kentucky approved of per diem arguments in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mattingly. 339 S.W.2d
155, 162 (Ky. 1960). The court held that "[slince the jury itself must arrive at a specific figure we see
no logical reason why counsel should not be permitted to speak in terms of specific figures." Id. at 161.
The court found that per diem arguments were no more speculative than lump sum arguments, which

are permitted in Kentucky. Id. (citing Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 183 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Ky. 1944)
(holding counsel is entitled to argue the amount of damages)). The court also cited the trial court's right
to reduce unreasonable damages as a safeguard against excessive damages. Id.
122. In holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by a chart depicting a per diem argument, the

Supreme Court of Louisiana specifically denied the Botta rule. Little v. Huges, 136 So. 2d 448, 452 (La.
1961). The court deemed Botta the minority, and cited twenty-one cases that held the opposite. Id. at
452-53. The court also held that the defendant may request that "the trial judge give a cautionary
instruction advising the jury that the per diem estimates and blackboard or chart computation are not
evidence nor exhibits, but constitute mere argument by the attorney." Id. at 453.
123. In Yates v. Wenk, the Supreme Court of Michigan made some bold assertions on the psychology

of jurors in holding that per diem arguments are not even objectionable. 109 N.W.2d 828, 830-31 (Mich.
1961). In specifically rejecting the reasoning in Botta, the court used some familiar criticisms of Botta.
Id. at 830. The court disagreed with Botta's rejection of per diem arguments on the basis that pain and
suffering are impossible to equate to money, saying this is exactly what juries are asked to do and "to
which the lawyers' arguments are required to be directed." Id. The court relied on the then current law
in Michigan to read the jury the ad damnum from the pleadings to the jury, as further reasoning to allow
the per diem arguments. Id. at 831. While the Michigan statute on pleadings was amended in 1986,
restricting plaintiff's from stating a specific amount in their pleadings if that amount is over $25,000,
there has been no opinion reversing Yates on per diem arguments. MICH. CT. R. 2.111.
The court also declared that the per diem argument would not lead to excessive verdicts for
plaintiffs for two reasons. Yates, 109 N.W.2d at 831. First, that such arguments would be "effectively
balanced by defendant's lawyer's counter argument." Id. Second, in an extremely original take on the
psychology of jurors, the court stated that "juries automatically discount 'lawyer talk' to some degree."
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Id. The court also said that trial judges instruct that the arguments of counsel are not evidence. Id.
124. Minnesota's Supreme Court jurisprudence on per diem arguments is quite confusing, although
in the end, it appears as though they are permissible. Originally, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held
that per diem arguments were impermissible because "[a]n award for pain, suffering, and disability on
a per diem basis ignores the subjective basis of such damages." Ablstrom v. Minneapolis, 68 N.W.2d
873, 891 (Minn. 1955). The court noted that damages for pain and suffering were not subject to being
reduced to present value due to their inability to be "reduced to mathematical formulae," thus, the same
reasoning should apply to counsel's use of per diem arguments for pain and suffering. Id.
In a case decided by the court just eight days after Ahistrom, the court added that pain and
suffering are not uniform from day to day, and counsel using a per diem argument will choose "the worst
hour or the worst day as a yardstick for evaluating pain." Hallada v. Great N. Ry., 69 N.W.2d 673, 687
(Minn. 1955). The court seemed to frown upon all segmentation arguments, even for loss of earning
capacity, saying that such arguments "though illuminating, may be misleading." Id. However, the court
went on to state "[w]hatever process is adopted in fixing an injured person's damages, the reasonableness
of the lump sum awarded by the jury must, in the last analysis, also be tested from the unitary standpoint
of what total financial benefits that lump sum will confer upon the injured person as a means of making
him financially whole." Id. The court found no prejudice or passion from the jury, but held that the
verdict was excessive and cited the per diem argument as the cause of the excessive award. Id.
The very next year,the court seemed to back track from Halladain Boutang v. Twin City Motor
Bus Co., 80 N.W.2d 30, 39 (Minn. 1956). The court stated that neither Ahlstrom nor Hallada held that
a "mathematical formula may not be used for purely illustrative purposes." Id. The court simply stated
that Hallada said appellate courts could not use per diem formulas for determining the reasonableness
of verdicts. Id. The court went on to state "[tihis rule does not bar the use of the mathematical formula
for purely illustrative purposes." Id.
However, that principle was confused in a case heard twenty-two years after Ahistrom. Busch
v. Busch Const., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 399 (Minn. 1977). The court stated that per diem arguments
were not allowed for "pain and suffering, and for other generally non-quantifiable compensatory
awards." Id. (citing Ahistrom, 68 N.W.2d at 890). Busch concerned damages for loss of consortium,
which the court found easily quantifiable and thus per diem arguments were permissible for such. Id.
After Busch, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota quoted a 1970 Supreme Court of Minnesota case "[t]his
approach is not found objectionable where it is coupled with an instruction that the argument is not to
be substituted for evidence and that the jury should follow the court's general instructions regarding that

element of damage." Cafferty v. Monson, 360 N.W.2d 414,417 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Christy
v. Saliterman, 179 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. 1970)).
125.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that per diem arguments were proper before most states

had decided the issue. Four-Cty. Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 73 So. 2d 144, 152 (Miss. 1954). The
court upheld a per diem argument for $5 per day for pain and suffering, stating that "'counsel may in
argument to the jury suggest and state what he believes the evidence shows in the way of a damage
award . . . and that counsel may draw deductions as to the extent of pecuniary damage, within the

confines of the evidence." Id. (quoting J.D. Wright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786,789
(Tex. Civ. App. 1950)). A few years later, the court affirmed Four-Cty. Arnold v. Ellis, 97 So. 2d 744
(Miss. 1957). In Arnold, the counsel argued that the plaintiff's pain was worth twenty cents per hour,
which the court held was only a suggestion of what he thought the pain was worth. Id. at 747. Counsel
has "the right to state to the jury what he thought would be proper damages for the jury to award for this
item, (pain) in his opening statement and arguments." Id.
126. New Mexico agrees with California's Beagle case, and allows per diem arguments in the state.

Higgins v. Hermes, 552 P.2d 1227, 1230 (N.M. 1976). The court acknowledged that the argument at
issue was not a traditional per diem argument in that counsel asked for a lump sum, calculated the
number of days the plaintiff would suffer, did not do the final calculation, but still approved of the
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traditional argument. Id. Contrasting Beagle against Botta, the court found issue with a number of
Botta's lines of reasoning. Id. The argument is not improper because it presents information not found
in evidence. Id. On the contrary, "the evidence of the suffering and pain undergone by the plaintiff forms
a sufficient foundation for the award of a specific monetary sum" and counselors are permitted to make
reasonable inferences from the evidence. Id.
The court also rejected Bota's theory that juries latch on to specific numbers presented to
them, causing excessive verdicts. Id. The court found two faults with the theory. Id. First, New Mexico
allows lump sum arguments, while New Jersey does not. Id. "Secondly, we know of no real support for
the theory that the per diem arguments results in excessive verdicts, and prefer to control the evil of
excessive verdicts by the normal processes of judicial review." Id.
127. Weeks v. Holsclaw, 295 S.E.2d 596, 600 (N.C. 1982) ("We are persuaded by the reasoning of
those courts which conclude that the per diem argument may be used provided it is accompanied by
cautionary instructions to the jury.").
128. Ohio allows per diem arguments for pain and suffering. Grossnickle v. Vill. of Germantown,
209 N.E.2d 442,445 (Ohio 1965). The court first outlined the main reasons againstper diem arguments:
(1) it displaces the common knowledge and experience possessed by a jury of the nature of pain
and suffering, (2) it ignores the fact that pain is generally intermittent, (3) it makes no allowance
for a discount for the present use of the total award, and (4) it stretches speculation to absurdity
in that pain measured by, for example, a penny a second is equal to $31,536 a year. Id. at 446.
The court then "disposed" of each of the arguments against per diem:
(1) [t]he practical fact is that no one intimately experienced with a situation similar to that of
the plaintiff in any case would be permitted to sit on a jury; hence, the average juror is
unacquainted with the type of pain or suffering which he is called upon to translate into
monetary value. (2) Intermittent pain may be, but suffering the loss of a member or of normal
activities is continual. (3) An award in gross is never discounted by the court and, if by the jury,
the factor used is never disclosed. (4) The absurdity of any hypothesis is fair game for the
opposing party. Id.
The court then stated that "the position against the argument in question comes close to a
position against any monetary recovery for pain and suffering whatsoever ..... Id. at 446-47.
The court went on to say that that the opposing party should be given equal opportunity to
counter the argument. Id. at 447. While in Grossnickle, the plaintiff did not bring up the per diem
argument until the defense was unable to rebut it, the court still upheld the verdict because the defense
counsel did not object at trial. Id.
129. Oregon did not decide on the propriety ofper diem arguments until 1977. DeMaris v. Whittier,
569 P.2d 605, 607-08 (Or. 1977). The Supreme Court of Oregon held that lump sum arguments are
permissible, stating "as long as damages for pain and suffering continue to be a proper element of
damages, we are of the opinion that counsel can properly suggest what is reasonable compensation." Id.
at 607. The court went on to say that if a lump sum is proper, the per diem argument "does not appear
to us to be improper." Id. The court did not offer much reasoning, simply differentiating Oregon from
Botta's holding that New Jersey does not permit lump sum arguments. Id. at 608. However, the court
did liken its reasoning to a similar argument in a case on loss of earning capacity in which there was no
evidence introduced on the amount of earning capacity lost. Id. at 607 (citing Rich v. Tite-Knot Pine
Mill, 421 P.2d 370 (Or. 1966)). In Rich, the court specifically pointed out that the argument at issue in
the case was not for pain and suffering before holding it permissible for loss of earning capacity. Rich,
421 P. 2d at 378. The reasoning behind the holding was that it "is not a representation to the jury that
plaintiff will lose a specific amount of money per day, but is a suggested course of reasoning from the
evidence of his injuries . . . ." Id.
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130. Rhode Island is another state that allows attorneys to argue noneconomic damages using a per
diem argument. Worsley v. Corcelli, 377 A.2d 215, 218 (R.I. 1977). Plaintiff's counsel had proposed to
the trial judge four different possible arguments for use in counsel's closing argument: (1) add up the
medical bills and lost wages and multiply them by three or four to reach a total damages award; (2) use
the plaintiff s annual salary as the value of a year of pain; (3) a traditional per diem argument; or (4) tell
the jury the ad damnum, and then suggest they choose a percentage of that for their final award. Id. at
217. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, after citing what appears to be every case to date for or against
the per diem argument, held that per diem arguments are proper for counsel to use in closing statements.
Id. at 218. The court found there were sufficient safeguards against excessive verdicts, mentioning
instructions from trial courts that the argument is not evidence, rebuttal from opposing counsel. Id. The
court also mentioned that juries tend to discount "Lawyers' Talk" and the risk that asking for too much
could damage the entire argument. Id. at 219. Lastly, the trial judge can always reduce "the award if it
shocks the conscience or clearly demonstrates that the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice, or
that it proceeded upon a clearly erroneous basis in arriving at its award. Id. (citing Ruggieri v.
Beauregard, 291 A.2d 413 (R.I. 1972); Raiff v. Yellow Cab Co., 176 A.2d 718 (R.I. 1962); Broccoli v.
Krzystron, 137 A.2d 740 (R.I. 1958); McGowan v. Interstate Consol. St. Ry. 38 A.2d 497 (R.I. 1897)).
131. Vermont was very late in deciding that per diem arguments are permissible. Debus v. Grand
Union Stores of Vt., 621 A.2d 1288 (Vt. 1993). The Supreme Court of Vermont held that since counsel
is permitted to argue a lump sum, telling the jury how that figure was reached is not impermissible. Id.
at 1291. Because the jury is directed to award money for pain, they therefore "can benefit by guidance
offered by counsel in closing argument as to how they can construct that equation." Id. at 1291. The
court did caution plaintiffs from going too far, but held that defense counsel's rebuttal is enough to
defend against excessive verdicts, and if not, the trial court can reduce such awards. Id. at 1290. In a
departure from many other states, the court went on to hold that the argument does not need to be
accompanied by a specific instruction. Id. The usual instruction that counsel's arguments are not
evidence is sufficient. Id. at 1291. The court also approved of plaintiffs counsel's own statements to the
jury that pain is not easy to quantify. Id. Also, it appears that in Vermont, future damages for pain and
suffering should be reduced to present value. Id. at 1291-92 (quoting defendant's proposed jury
instruction on present value that specifically includes pain and suffering, but not commenting on the
propriety of doing so, holding only that the pattern jury instruction that states all future damages should
be reduced).
132. In Caley v. Manicke, the Supreme Court of Illinois laid out its reasoning for allowing lump
sum arguments, but not per diem. 182 N.E.2d 206 (Ill. 1962). In holding that the per diem argument is
improper, the court states that such arguments create "an illusion of certainty" that is not inherent in pain
and suffering. Id. at 208. The court also states that a jury warning that such arguments are not evidence
"ignores human nature." Id. at 209. Also, an opposing per diem argument would not "remedy the
situation because this would only emphasize the improper argument and would further mislead the jury
into relying on the formulae and figures rather than the actual evidence of damages." Id. The Supreme
Court of Illinois went on to hold that arguing a lump sum for pain and suffering is permissible. Id. The
fact that such had been the accepted practice and custom in Illinois and that the court considered "such
practice far less misleading than the argument of a mathematical formula" were the court's reasoning
for the apparent contradiction. Id.
Interestingly, the Appellate Court upheld the admissibility of a plaintiffs argument that
requested $49,000 for 49 years of pain because "[c]ounsel may properly suggest a lump sum figure for
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pain and suffering, and may make reference to life expectancy in conjunction therewith." Watson v. City
of Chicago, 464 N.E.2d 1100, 1102 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (citing Caley 182 N.E.2d at 206; Thompson v.
Lietz, 420 N.E.2d 232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)). The court reasoned that the formula used was "glaringly
transparent," and that to hold it improper would essentially declare all lump sum arguments "which [are]
easily divisible by the plaintiff's life expectancy, [improper] lest the jury perceive therein some
mathematical relationship between the amount requested and life expectancy." Id. "A plaintiff's life
expectancy is an important element to be considered in determining an award for future pain and
suffering ... and it is therefore not unreasonable to expect that there will be some relationship between
life expectancy and the figure suggested by counsel in arguing that element of damages." Id. at 1103.
133. Maine allows counsel to argue a lump sum for damages to the jury in closing arguments.
Horner v. Flynn, 334 A.2d 194, 207 (Me. 1975). Maine's Practice Series states that per diem arguments
are prohibited. 4 Maine Prac., Trial Handbook § 37:10 (2016 ed.). However, the case it cited is less clear.
Hartt v. Wiggin, 379 A.2d 155, 158 (Me. 1977). It states because the court found that the argument at
issue was not a per diem argument, it was "wholly unnecessary for [the court] to pass upon the propriety
of so-called per diem argument for pain and suffering, and we intimate no opinion whatever on that
question." Id. The plaintiff in Hartt,had simply broken the total damages requested into categories. Id.
134. The Supreme Court of Missouri proscribed per diem arguments in Faught v. Washam, 329
S.W.2d 588, 603 (Mo. 1959) rev'd on other grounds by Tune v. Synergy Gas Corp., 883 S.W.2d 10,
28-29 (Mo. 1994) (holding that it is always prejudicial error for an attorney to violate the golden rule).
The court stated such arguments are "calculated and designed to implant in the jurors' minds definite
figures and amount not theretofore in the record (and which otherwise could not get into the record) and
to influence the jurors to adopt those figures and amounts in evaluating pain and suffering . . . ." Id. The
court used as part of their reasoning a case out of Florida, where a jury returned the exact number the
plaintiff's counsel had suggested using a per diem argument, and which the Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed without opinion. Id. (citing Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Braddock, 96 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1957)).
It appears Missouri has decided that any jury that returns a verdict that is exactly what the plaintiff has
asked for is unreasonable. In 1978, the rule proscribing per diem arguments was upheld, but the court
also noted that it had not found a single case that had been reversed because of the use of such an
argument. Graeff v. Baptist Temple of Springfield, 576 S.W.2d 291, 302-03 (Mo. 1978).
In Goldstein v. Fendelman, the court affirmed the holding of Faught, yet distinguished lump
sum arguments holding it permissible for counsel to state amounts that are fair and reasonable. 336
S.W.2d 661, 667 (Mo. 1960). The court set a limitation to such arguments, declaring it unfair for
plaintiffs to make the argument for the "first time in his closing arguments, when defendant's counsel
has made no argument as to amount." Id.
135. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire delivered two opinions within a month of each other
proscribing against the use of per diem arguments. The first, Duguay v. Gelinas, held that per diem
arguments are impermissible but that lump sum arguments are permissible. 182 A.2d 451,453-55 (N.H.
1962). The court found that per diem arguments are too susceptible to manipulation stating "[t]he
mathematical formula applied to the plaintiffs pain and suffering ... for her life expectancy of 233,600
hours can result in any amount that the imagination of counsel deems advantageous." Id. at 454. The
argument "introduces an element of apparent precision that is illusory and compounds the dangers of
conjecture." Id. The court cited Seffort v. Los Angeles Transit Lines out of California as an example of
jurors adopting the mathematical formula as fact. Id. at 454 (citing Seffort v. Los Angeles Transit Lines,
364 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1961)). In Seffort, the jury returned a verdict of the exact sum requested by plaintiff's
counsel, and the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. Seffort, 364 P.2d at 347; Duguay,
182 A.2d. at 454.
In the second case, Chamberlain v. PalmerLumber, Inc., the plaintiff had affixed specific sums
to the year right after the injury, and then a smaller sum per year for the next four years. 183 A.2d 906,
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908 (N.H. 1962). The court found that this violated the rule announced in Duguay. Id. This case is
interesting, in that it disallows an argument that seems more reasonable, assigning higher amounts for
pain and suffering in years when the pain is greater, rather than a uniform amount spread throughout the
time of pain. Counsel in Chamberlain also made a traditional per diem argument, based on weeks, which
the court deemed improper. Id.
136. New York's highest court, the Court of Appeals of New York, has never ruled on the per diem
arguments. The closest they came was in Tate v. Colabello, in which they deemed the argument at issue
not aper diem argument, stating "we have not had the opportunity to pass on [per diem arguments], this
case does not present the occasion to do so." 445 N.E.2d 1101, 1103 (N.Y. 1983). Counsel had broken
down the injury into time units, however, counsel did not assign specific amounts to those time units,
nor multiply it out to reach a total amount of damages. Id. Interestingly, in the same opinion, the court
upheld precedent that allows the plaintiff to make a lump sum argument. Id. (citing Rice v. Ninacs, 312

N.Y.S.2d 246, 251 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970)). Therefore, in New York, a plaintiff may argue a total lump
sum, and break down pain and suffering into time periods so long as they do not assign amounts to those

time periods nor do the math for the jury. See, e.g., Miller v. Owen, 709 N.Y.S.2d 378, 378-79 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding that plaintiff is able to state lump sum, but a per diem argument in opening
statement is impermissible because dollar amounts were assigned to the time units).
137. In North Dakota, counsel may make a lump sum argument, provided "that the argument has
some foundation in the evidence of the case." Brauer v. James J. Igoe & Sons Const., Inc., 186 N.W.2d
459, 475 (N.D. 1971). However, The Supreme Court of North Dakota deemed per diem arguments

improper, as an invasion of the province of the jury. King v. Ry. Exp. Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509,
517 (N.D. 1961). The court held that such arguments amounted to counsel testifying, and permitting the
argument creates a danger that "the jury will substitute counsel's suggested value of such items for
evidence." Id. It is the jury's duty to determine what is a fair and reasonable verdict based on the
evidence. Id. The per diem argument allows counsel to place figures before the jury that are not based
on any evidence from the case. Id. The court stated that the arguments simply "back up and bolster the
plaintiff's claim for pain and suffering ..... Id. Had plaintiffs counsel merely suggested that the jury
create its own per diem formula in determining the damages, there would be no error. Id. But, because
the counselor suggested amounts, and the jury might have adopted those amount, "the verdict would not
be based on competent evidence in the record." Id. The court overturned the verdict, even though they
held that the verdict was not excessive. Id.
138. South Carolina has a very interesting rule regarding per diem arguments. In Harper v. Bolton
the Supreme Court of South Carolina held "it was error for the trial judge to permit counsel for the
respondent to endorse on a blackboard his own personal opinion as to the per diem value of pain and
suffering." 124 S.E.2d 54, 59 (S.C. 1962). The court used the familiar reasoning that by doing so, counsel
is arguing to the jury facts with no foundation in evidence, and the "inferences [are] based on or drawn
from facts which are not even admissible in evidence." Id.
Another case in South Carolina dealing with per diem arguments held that when "counsel
carefully refrained from giving his opinion as to the per diem value thereof, being careful to point out
that only the jury could place a monetary value thereon; and we are of opinion that the use of the per
diem formula for illustrative purposes was not error." Edwards v. Lawton, 136 S.E.2d 708, 711 (S.C.
1964). In Edwards, plaintiffs counsel told the jury it could use a number of methods to determine a
reasonable award for pain and suffering, and that one possibility was a per diem formula. Id. at 709.
"Now, if you decide, and you may decide, that he is entitled to fifteen dollars a day, or ten dollars a day,
or five dollars a day, or nothing . . . ." Id. Plaintiffs counsel continually reminded the jury it was up to
them to determine a value per diem, but also continually suggested figures, and multiplied them out to
get total suggested awards. Id. It seems as though the court felt that since counsel gave not just one, but
multiple suggestions to the jury while reminding it that it was entirely its decision, the court held that
this was not an improper per diem argument under Harper. Id. at 709-11.
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It appears that South Carolina allows plaintiffs to make lump sum arguments on pain and
suffering. In Felderv. Johnson, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed a verdict in favor of the

plaintiff. 257 S.E.2d 714, 716 (S.C. 1979). Plaintiffs counsel had argued amounts for medical bills and
lost wages, and then a separate amount for "just not having a leg and not being able to do the things that

people can do who have two good legs for the rest of his life of 39 years . . . ." Id. The defendant
challenged the argument under Harper, and the Supreme Court deemed the argument was proper. Id.
139. Virginia has statutory authority for informing the jury the total amount of damages sought. VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-379.1 (West 2015). Breaking damage arguments down into component parts, i.e.,
asking for a total specific sum for pain and suffering, is also permissible. Wakole v. Barber, 722 S.E.2d
238, 241 (Va. 2012). On the other hand, Virginia does not permit per diem arguments on pain and
suffering, as the Supreme Court deemed that such arguments invade the province of the jury. Certified

T.V. & Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 109 S.E.2d 126, 131 (Va. 1959). To the court, the argument "may
tend to instill in the minds of the jurors impressions not founded on the evidence. Verdicts should be
based on deductions drawn by the jury from the evidence presented and not the mere adoption of
calculations submitted by counsel." Id.
140. In holding that per diem arguments are impermissible, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin started
by pointing out that few trial judges in the state had allowed them. Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban

Transp. Corp., 106 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Wisc. 1960). The court also held the arguments are "pure
speculation by counsel, which is not supported by the evidence and present matters which do not appear
in the record." Id. at 279. The court points out that pain is not uniform for the plaintiff over their life,
and there is no mathematical formula which can account for the varying degrees of pain from day to
day. Id. It is used to make a certain amount of money seem reasonable by showing that it really is only
a small amount of money on a day to day basis. Id. The court took issue with this in that it establishes
"a fixed standard to displace the jury's concept of what is a fair and reasonable amount to compensate
for the pain and suffering sustained . . . ." Id. at 279-80. Another contention the court has with the
argument is "[t]he absurdity of a mathematical formula is demonstrated by applying it to its logical
conclusion. If a day may be used as a unit of time in measuring pain and suffering, there is no logical
reason why an hour or a minute or a second could not be used, or perhaps even a heart beat [sic] since
we live from heart beat [sic] to heart beat [sic]." Id. at 280. In a later case, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin affirmed a verdict, even though the plaintiff used a per diem argument, because the defendant

was not timely in objecting to its use. Miles v. Ace Van Lines & Movers, Inc., 241 N.W.2d 186, 189
(Wisc. 1976).
Attorneys are permitted to make lump sum arguments for pain and suffering. Affett, 106
N.W.2d at 280. The Supreme Court also took away much of the trial courts' discretion on allowing lump
sum arguments they feel are unreasonable, holding that the test is not the trial judge's belief of a
reasonable award, but the juries'. Fischer v. Fischer, 142 N.W.2d 857, 861 (Wisc. 1966), rev'd on other

grounds by Matter of Stromsted's Estate, 299 N.W. 2d 226 (Wic. 1980) (concerning who is a party to a
contract when the husband consents to medical procedures for his wife). The court rejected the idea that
to ask for too large or too small of an amount was an ethics violation, quoting a prior case: "The
measurement of pain and suffering is so patently thorny that the yardstick used by counsel should not
be condemned merely because the court considers it too long or too short." Id. (quoting Halsted v.

Kosner, 118 N.W.2d 864,866 (Wisc. 1963)). The court had faith in the jury's ability to discern or reject
extremes in the appraisal of damages, and we conclude that if trial counsel is permitted to express their
own subjective advocate's appraisal of damages that demands completely unsupported by evidence will
be rejected by the jury. The probability of a "backfire" in the event of an unreasonable demand is likely
to make this phase of trial advocacy self-policing. Id. at 862.
In Fisher, the trial judge had sustained an objection to plaintiffs counsel stating a lump sum
request for pain and suffering. Id. at 860-61. The Supreme Court was concerned that in doing so, the
judge had tipped to the jury that he felt such an amount was unreasonable. Id. at 863.
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141. NJ. Ct. R. 1:7-1(b) allows either party to argue that "unliquidated damages be calculated on a
time-unit without reference to a specific sum." Id. The judge must give a limiting instruction that it is
argument only, and not evidence. Id.
142. The Massachusetts Practice Series states that it is improper for counsel to make a lump sum
argument to the jury without citing any authority for the rule. 43 MASS. PRAC., TRIAL PRACTICE § 19.20
(2d ed. 2013). The Massachusetts rule on per diem arguments seems to be similar to the statutory rules
in New Jersey, in that they may break down the time of pain and suffering into smaller units, without

assigning a total value. See Cuddy v. L & M Equipment Co., 225 N.E.2d 904, 908 (Mass. 1967). In the
argument at issue in Cuddy, plaintiffs used a quasi per diem argument, noting life expectancy of the
plaintiff, and suggesting a number of possible sums per week, while also reminding the jury that it was
up to it to determine the value. Id. at 908 n.3. Counsel also told the jury they could reject the life
expectancy given in evidence, and determine its own life expectancy for the plaintiff. Id. The court
expressly states that it is not deciding on the propriety of per diem arguments, but goes on to say that
"[w]hatever dangers such a line of argument may be thought to present, those dangers were adequately
forestalled by the judge's charge to the jury." Id. at 909. The practice series also suggests that plaintiff's
attorneys break down life expectancy into days, and then ask the jury to determine a value per day for
pain and suffering. 43 MASS. PRAC., TRIAL PRACTICE § 19.15 (2d ed. 2013).
143. Delaware has a rule proscribing per diem arguments that dates back to the 1958 case Henne v.
Balick. 146 A.2d 394 (Del. 1958). The Delaware Supreme Court gave the defendant a new trial because
the plaintiff had used a per diem argument for pain and suffering. Id. at 398. The court reasoned that
because pain is different for different individuals, and even varies in degree day to day for the same
individual, a per diem argument is improper. Id. The court also held it improper because no court would
allow an expert to testify that an individual experiences a specified dollars' worth of pain per day, so
therefore an attorney may not assert that which an expert may not. Id. Such a determination is left for
the jury. Id. The argument was "speculation of counsel for plaintiff unsupported by the evidence" and
was used "solely to introduce and keep before the jury figures out of all proportion to those which the
jury would otherwise have had in mind, with the view of securing from the jury a verdict much larger
than that warranted by the evidence." Id.
144. Pennsylvania does not allow lump sum nor per diem arguments, providing little reasoning in
both cases deciding the issues. In holding lump sum arguments impermissible in "cases where the
damages are unliquidated and incapable of measurement by a mathematical standard," the court merely
states "they tend to instill in the minds of the jury impressions not founded upon the evidence." Stassun
v. Chapin, 188 A. 111 (Pa. 1936). For its rule proscribing per diem arguments, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania simply stated that they are "of course improper." Ruby v. Casello, 201 A.2d 219, 220 (Pa.

1964).
145. West Virginia bars the use of per diem arguments under the court's reasoning that "[t]here can
be no doubt that if the mathematical formula arguments were permitted, verdicts would be increased
materially because of the emotions of sympathy, prejudice or compassion." Crum v. Ward, 122 S.E.2d
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States that defy categorization are:
1. Arizonal 47

.

18, 27 (W.Va. 1961). In an extensive opinion on the issue, the Supreme Court of West Virginia recited
much of the Botta case, diving into psychological aspects of the argument without citing any references.
Id. The court was concerned with the power of suggestion, with its "immeasurable effects," and that
"[to merely suggest the existence of pain and suffering, especially pain and suffering of a fellow human
being, engenders or activates such complex emotions as sympathy, prejudice, compassion and caprice
that exist in every normal person, including each of the twelve jurors, and creates a fervent, resolute
desire to relieve or aid the sufferer." Id. at 26. Furthermore, the power of suggestion is even more
dangerous in the hands of experienced, learned and eloquent counsel, and even more greatly enhanced
by the action of the trial judge in telling the jury, which he effectively does by approving or permitting
the argument, that the suggestion of money value of pain and suffering is a reasonable argument and is
justifiable, notwithstanding the complete absence of facts related to money value thereof. Id. at 26-27.
As for lump sum arguments, it seems as though West Virginia does not like the plaintiff making
any statement about monetary figures for any type of damages. See Bennet v. 3 C Coal Co., 379 S.E.2d
388 (W.Va. 1989). In Bennett, the court held that "the better practice is to avoid mentioning to the jury
the amount sued for, but such disclosure alone may not be reversible error." Id. at 397. The court found
four reasons for prejudicial error in that case: (1) the only damages sought in the case were for mental
distress and punitive; (2) amount was stated in both opening and closing; (3) the jury returned a verdict
in the exact amount requested by plaintiff; and (4) there was no instruction on "how to assess either
compensatory or punitive damages." Id.
146. Wyoming rejected the propriety of the use of per diem arguments in Henman v. Klinger. 409
P.2d 631 (Wyo. 1966). After the perfunctory recitation of decisions from other states, the court started
its own analysis by stating that "[n]o witness can testify as to a per diem value for pain and suffering .
. . Pain and suffering are not dealt with as a commodity in the marketplace." Id. at 634. The amount to
be awarded is to be determined by the jury, and the court took exception to the argument that not allowing
per diem arguments leads to blind guesses by the jury, stating "[hiow can the jury function be aided by
an argument which necessarily is premised on assumptions of fact having no evidentiary basis and
tempered only by the candor of counsel advancing such an argument?" Id. The court prefers the estimates
of jurors over counsel, as counsel's guesses are "nothing more than a device to clothe with an aura of
reasonableness the often fantastic claims made for such an element of damage and hence a technique
tending primarily to mislead the jury." Id. The Wyoming Supreme Court, as well as the trial court during
the motion for a new trial, found error in allowing the per diem argument over objection, but decided
the error was not prejudicial, because the amount awarded was not excessive. Id. at 635. Interestingly,
in a later case, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that the question "[tIhis pain, what is it worth, a
dollar a day, a dollar a week?" fell short of being a per diem argument proscribed against in Henman.
Combined Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1050 (Wyo. 1978).
There is no Supreme Court of Wyoming opinion deciding the propriety of lump sum
arguments, so Wyoming is a good candidate for a polling of practitioners when it comes to lump sum
arguments.
147. In Arizona, the permissibility of a per diem argument is left up to the trial judge. O'Rielly
Motor Co. v. Rich, 411 P.2d 194, 200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966). In O'Rielly, the plaintiff used a chart
showing pain and suffering damages with suggested dollars-per-year awards in the closing statements.
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Arkansas
Maryland1 4 9
Montana15 0
Nebraska15 1
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Id. The Court of Appeals, noting the Botta ruling and a number of competing rulings, held that because
a cautionary instruction had been given and the damages award was not being contested as unreasonable,
it would not overrule the sound judgment of the trial judge. Id. If the defendant fails to object to the use
of the per diem argument, it constitutes a waiver. Myers v. Rollette, 439 P.2d 497, 500 (Ariz. 1968).
148. Arkansas, like Arizona, leaves the decision on per diem to the discretion of the trial court.

Vanlandingham v. Gartman, 367 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Ark. 1963). The court held that when "it is perfectly
clear that the figures on the chart or blackboard were nothing more than argument by counsel, we cannot
say there was an abuse of discretion by the trial court in permitting its use." Id. The court acknowledges
counter holdings from other courts, but holds that as long as there is evidence of pain and suffering, a
plaintiff may make arguments as to the value of those damages. Id. at 114.
149. Maryland is another state that leaves the determination on per diem arguments in the hands of

the trial judges. Bauman v. Woodfield, 223 A.2d 364, 373 (Md. 1966). The Court of Appeals of
Maryland held in Bauman that while per diem arguments are permissible, the trial judge refusing to
allow the plaintiff's per diem argument was not reversible error. Id. The court did explain some other
rules for per diem arguments. Id. They are permissible in opening or closing statements, and if the
argument is first made in closing, then the opposing party should be given the opportunity to rebut the
argument. Id.
150. Montana leaves "the propriety of counsel's use of a per diem argument to the sound discretion
of the trial court." Vogel v. Fetter Livestock Co., 394 P.2d 766,772 (Mont. 1964) (citing Wyant v. Dunn,

368 P.2d 917, 920 (Mont. 1962)). In Wyant, the court differentiated Botta, by acknowledging that in
Montana, the complaint is read to the jury. Wyant, 368 P.2d at 920. The court in Vogel held that although
the judge should have given a limiting instruction on per diem arguments, the failure to do so did not
result in any prejudice against the defendant, and was not reversible error. Vogel, 394 P.2d at 772.
151. Nebraska allows per diem arguments, however the rule is based on some interesting
interpretation of the primary case for the state. Baylor v. Tyrrell, 131 N.W.2d 393 (Neb. 1964), rev'd on

other grounds by, Larsen v. First Bank, 515 N.W. 2d 804 (Neb. 1994) (dealing with pleading
contributory negligence). In Tyrrell, the court decided not to take on the permissibility of per diem
arguments, specifically stating "[aIssuming, but not deciding, that the use of a mathematical formula is
error . . . ." Id. at 398. The court used this assumption to hold that the argument at issue was not even a
per diem argument. Id. Plaintiffs counsel merely broke the pain and suffering damages into five
different areas: time spent in the hospital, post hospital/pretrial, future damages, mental suffering, and
loss of earning capacity. Id. at 396. The court differentiated the argument from a traditional per diem
argument that breaks the damages down into hours or days, and multiplies that by a specific dollar
amount. Id. at 398. The court held that assigning lump sums to the different time periods was just a
modified lump sum argument, which is permissible in Nebraska. Id.
The next time the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the issue was over forty years later.

Richardson v. Children's Hosp., 787 N.W.2d 235 (Neb. 2010). The court started by saying that "the
conduct of final argument is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and absent abuse of discretion,
the trial court's ruling regarding final argument will not be disturbed." Id. at 245. The court went on to
interpret Baylor to hold that traditional per diem arguments are permissible. Id. at 246. Verdicts should
be assessed on their reasonableness, and whether the evidence supports them. Id.
152. The Supreme Court of Nevada laid out it's reasoning for the propriety of per diem arguments
in Johnson v. Brown. 345 P.2d 754, 759 (Nev. 1959). Pointing out the difference between New Jersey
law that does not allow the ad damnum to be read to the jury (one of the main reasons behind the Botta
holding), and Nevada law which allows for that, the court held that the permissibility of such arguments
are within the discretion of the trial judge. Id. See NEV.REV. STAT. ANN. § 16.090 (West 2013) (Nevada
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The states without final decisions from the court of final resort are:
1. Tennessee

55

still allows the pleadings to be read by counsel). When deemed permissible, it may only be used for
"illustrative purposes," and it must be premised by a warning that it is not evidence. Johnson, 345 P.2d
at 759. The court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the argument was permissible. Id.
153. Utah is another state that leaves the decision on the propriety of the per diem argument in the

hands of the trial judge. Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 354 P.2d 575, 576 (Utah 1960). The
Supreme Court of Utah, after briefly citing cases from other states on the issue, stated that trial judges
in the state had customarily allowed such arguments. Id. The concurrence to the case made a strong case
for trial judges allowing the argument. Id. at 576-78 (Crockett, CJ., concurring). Chief Justice Crockett
stated that precluding counsel from discussing amounts for noneconomic damages would in essence
preclude them from discussing the entire issue of noneconomic damages. Id. at 578 (Crockett, CJ.,
concurring). "If he can talk about it at all and mention some gross figure, which it has always been
assumed he could do, it would seem no more harmful to invite the jury's attention to a process of analysis
and reasoning with respect thereto based upon the time involved and reasonable compensation therefor."
Id. (Crockett CJ., concurring).
154. Perdiem arguments are permissible in Washington. Jones v. Hogan, 351 P.2d 153, 159 (Wash.
1960). After discussing the pros and cons of allowing per diem arguments quoting extensively from
Ratner v. Arrington out of Florida, the court agreed with Nevada's recent holding in Johnson, allowing
them because in Washington it is permissible to read the ad damnum to the jury. Id. at 158. "Counsel is

allowed a rather wide latitude in jury argument, which is wisely left in the hands of the trial judge ....
Id. at 159.
155.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee has yet to rule on the propriety of per diem arguments. See

Elliot v. Cobb, 320 S.W.3d 246, 252 (Tenn. 2010) (Koch, J., concurring) ("Accordingly, this opinion
should not be construed as necessarily approving 'per diem' arguments that are frequently used by
lawyers to guide jurors in assessing noneconomic damages . . . . Issues relating to the propriety of
particular arguments must await the appropriate cases.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Elliot
also cleared up some conflicting statutes regarding arguing noneconomic damages. In Tennessee,
plaintiffs have the statutory right "to argue the worth or monetary value of pain and suffering to the jury;
provided, that the argument shall conform to the evidence or reasonable deduction from the evidence in
such case." TENN. CODE § 20-9-304 (2009). But another statute states "[i]n a health care liability action
the pleading filed by the plaintiff may state a demand for a specific sum, but such demand shall not be
disclosed to the jury during a trial of the case ..... TENN. CODE § 29-26-117 (2012).
In Elliot, the Court held that precedent relied upon by the defendant in arguing that section 2926-117 precluded a medical malpractice plaintiff from arguing any specific sums for pain and suffer was

merely dicta. See Elliot, 320 S.W.3d at 250; see also, Runnells v. Rogers, S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1980)
(reading of the addamnum was harmless error "beyond doubt"); Guess v. Maury, 726 S.W.2d 906,91820 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (statement of plaintiff's counsel that the ease was "possibly a multi-milliondollar lawsuit" was violation of court's instructions, but case was decided on other grounds); DeMilt v.

Moss, No. 02AO 1-9611 -CV-00283 1997 WL 759440, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (statement of counsel
requesting a specific sum of money for four years of pain was just further reason for granting a new trial,
in a case where the issue was not before the court on appeal). The court then goes on to hold that section
29-67-117 proscribes reading the ad damnum from the complaint to the jury, but allows the plaintiff to
argue the worth of pain and suffering in closing argument. Elliot, 320 S.W.3d at 251. The concurrence
was written to reemphasize that the argument must "conform to the evidence or reasonable deductions
from the evidence." Id. at 252 (Koch J., concurring) (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-9-304 (2009)).
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156. While the Supreme Court of Texas has yet to rule on the propriety of per diem arguments,
some of the courts of civil appeals have approved of the per diem arguments. See, e.g., Hernandez v.
Baucum, 344 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) ("We consider it fair argument and a rational
approach to treat damages for pain the way it was endured, month by month, and year by year.").
157. While the often-cited American Law Reports article Per Diem or Similar MathematicalBasis
for Fixing Damagesfor Painand Suffering, groups Oklahoma with states that hold per diem arguments
impermissible, the only case it cites evaded ruling on the issue. James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Per

Diem or Similar MathematicalBasisfor Fixing Damagesfor Pain and Suffering, 3 A.L.R.4th 940, 959
§5 (1981). In Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Jones, the court held that "[i]f we agreed with the
opinions of some other courts (cited by defendant's counsel) as to the impropriety, and great potential
for producing excessive verdicts, of using a blackboard before a jury as plaintiff's counsel did, still we
would have to recognize, under the harmless error doctrine, and, in accord with those same opinions,
that the test of prejudice to defendant, in an error such as the one complained of, is: Whether or not it
resulted in an excessive verdict?" 354 P.2d 415,420 (Okla. 1960) (original emphasis).
158. South Dakota has no opinion on the propriety of per diem arguments for pain and suffering.
The closest it has come was a decision on per diem arguments for loss of earning power. Jennings v.

Hodges, 129 N.W.2d 59, 64 (S.D. 1964). In appealing the trial court's ruling allowing the plaintiff to
suggest $5 or $10 per week for loss of earning power, the defendant cited the King case out of North

Dakota. Id. (citing King, 107 N.W.2d 509, 514 (N.D. 1961)). The South Dakota court pointed out that
King only proscribed per diem for pain and suffering, but since the damages at issue in King "had been
testified to and there was specific evidence" to them, the argument was proper. Id. In Jennings, the court
also noted the trial courts statement that the jury was not bound to the arguments of counsel. Id.
In a case concerning damages for wrongful death, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that it was
reversible error for counsel to request a lump sum award in closing argument, where they had offered
no "specific evidence or testimony regarding the pecuniary value of the decedent's services[.]" Estate
of He Crow v. Jensen, 494 N.W.2d 186, 192 (S.D. 1992). The argument at issue was: "I'm going to ask
you to give the children for the loss of their mother for the pecuniary loss 50,000 a year for 20 years
until they reach the age of maturity." Id. at 191. The jury returned a verdict that corresponded to the
exact amount requested. Id.
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B. Histogram ofDamages Awards by Scenario

Histogram of Damages Awards
trsenario

Damr-1ages

C. Regression Analysis
The following tables report three logistic regression models that predict
damages and expected value, respectively. For the damages analysis, only

mock juror awards that found the defendant liable were used. In the basic
model, the variables Lump Sum and Per Diem are dummy variables that
refer to the plaintiff s attorney's closing arguments. Lump Sum refers to the
plaintiff s attorney requesting $5 million. Per Diem refers to the plaintiff s
attorney characterizing the plaintiff s injury in terms of 4,979,520 minutes

of pain and suffering. In the second model, we added the "Age" variable.
In the third model, we added all our demographic information. Gender

is a dummy value which is positive if the participant was a male. Hispanic,
Asian, Black or African American,

and White are separate dummy
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variables. We did not include ethnicity variables in the third "damages only"
regression because of the small number of mock jurors that fell into these
categories.
The "Education" variable increased with additional education. It ranged
from 1 to 9, with 1 representing elementary school and 9 representing a
doctorate degree. The "Income" variable was higher for larger incomes. It
ranged from 1 to 13 with 1 representing less than $10,000 and 13
representing $200,000 or more. Finally, the "Politics" variable ranged from
1 to 7 with 1 representing "I strongly prefer the Democrats" to 7
representing "I strongly prefer the Republicans."
Table Al. Regression Models for Damages Only

Basic +Edu
Model

All Model

Variable

Basic Model

Lump Sum

1,368,211***

1,363,612***

1,352,952***

195,963

195,758

203,945

Per Diem

-149,855

Gender (male)
Age

4,283

Hispanic

163,232
-35,307

Education

-37,940

Income

-5,252

Politics

-29,533

Intercept

496,389***

640,479***

698,989(**)

Multiple R2

.186

.191

.179

* p<.05, * *p<.Ol

,

*** p < .001
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Table A2. Regression for Case Expected Value
Basic
Model"'
779,029***
226,757*

Variable
Lump Sum
Per Diem
Gender (male)
Age
Hispanic
Asian
Black or
African
American
White
Education
Income
Politics
Intercept
210,784*
Adjusted
.0889
Multiple R2
* p<.05, * *p<.01, *** p < .001

Basic +Edu
Model
770,109***
231,683*

-75,736*

526,707**
.0933

All Model
764,796***
239,713*
-68,212
-33.6
-105,178
-96,172
-33,915

-184,814
-78,067*
-5,756
-39,975
898,748*
.0887

159 For the basic model, the residuals from the linear regression are not consistent with the assumption
of independent identically distributed normal residuals. However, examination of bootstrap confidence
intervals for the regression coefficients confirm that the p-values for the intercept and anchor are less
than 0.001, while the p-value for the per diem coefficient is approximately 0.02.
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D. Variance Comparison
Equality of
Scenario
1
1
1
2
2
3

Scenario
2
3
4
3
4
4

Variances for
Damages
(untrimmed)
0.3960
0.0000
0.0000
0.0002
0.0000
0.2717

The Brown-Forsythe test of the pairwise equality of the variances.

